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ABSTRACT—In a small but significant portion of urban public housing, the 
dual legacies of segregation and concentrated poverty have long plagued 
residents. Over the course of decades, these legacies have contributed to 
chronic systemic failures, the burden of which has disproportionately fallen 
on members of minority groups. The federal government has responded 
through two strands of policies, each aimed at a different legacy. First, 
Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act to root out the last vestiges of state-
sanctioned segregation by affirmatively promoting racial integration. 
Second, and more recently, Congress created a program known as HOPE 
VI to combat the concentration of very poor residents in urban public 
housing by replacing dilapidated projects with mixed-income 
developments, which bring in moderate-income working families to serve 
as role models. But success in overcoming historical failures remains 
elusive—largely because housing policies that promote income mixing 
seem bound to come into conflict with housing policies that promote racial 
integration. Persistent patterns of residential segregation in HOPE VI 
communities attest to the problem. The use of restrictive income-based 
admissions policies has put once-distressed neighborhoods on track to 
become as segregated as before, though the racial pendulum has swung in 
the opposite direction. I thus argue that programs advancing racial 
integration should trump income-mixing considerations when the 
compasses point in different directions. Reaffirming racial integration as a 
primary policy goal would ultimately remedy the related harms of racial 
isolation and displacement that have continued to mar HOPE VI projects. 
Just as importantly, adopting an integrative norm comports with both the 
express obligations and underlying spirit of the Fair Housing Act. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For decades, two regrettable legacies have dominated the housing 
policy conversation in America’s most distressed urban neighborhoods: 
racial segregation and concentrated poverty. In combination, they have 
contributed to chronic systemic failures in the small but significant portion 
of public housing that can be found there. However, despite their tendency 
to overlap and even reinforce one another, these legacies give rise to 
distinct kinds of harms, and have thus inspired similarly distinct kinds of 
policy prescriptions. 
Residential segregation, for its part, continues to burden urban public 
housing sites and mobility programs despite significant progress in other 
facets of American society. The harms occasioned by segregation are, of 
course, beyond dispute. It is also difficult to deny that the federal 
government was at one time complicit in creating the conditions that 
precipitated these harms. The government itself appears to have conceded 
the point: Congress passed the Fair Housing Act (FHA) in 1968 to 
specifically address government-sanctioned discrimination in the housing 
arena and mandate official efforts to affirmatively promote racial 
integration to ameliorate entrenched problems.1 Since then, the courts have 
played a critical role in protecting the bite of the FHA’s requirements, 
 
1  Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801–819, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006)). 
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imposing additional desegregation policies where government-sponsored 
practices have threatened to undermine the FHA’s integrative norm.2 
The other dominant historical legacy has been the concentration of 
poor families and individuals in the very worst urban public housing 
projects.3 Over time, this process has produced vast pockets in the inner city 
where residents silently suffer from deprivations of resources and economic 
opportunity. Congress, having long debated the extent to which public 
housing should be reserved for the very poorest Americans, rather than 
members of different income groups, created a grant program known as 
HOPE VI in an effort to “[p]rovide housing that will avoid or decrease the 
concentration of very low-income families.”4 HOPE VI has funded the 
replacement of dilapidated high-rise projects with low-density, mixed-
income developments where moderate-income working residents are to 
serve as role models for their poor neighbors. Congress has authorized 
billions of dollars in grant money to pursue this goal.5 And income mixing, 
it seems, has produced measured benefits for some HOPE VI communities. 
A number of neighborhoods “have seen substantial increases in per capita 
incomes and substantial declines in unemployment rates and dependence on 
public assistance,” along with a drop in violent crime rates.6  
Housing policies that promote income mixing, however, seem bound to 
come into conflict with housing policies that promote racial integration—an 
inevitability demonstrated by persistent patterns of residential segregation 
in HOPE VI communities. Indeed, it appears quite clear that income-based 
admissions policies in urban HOPE VI redevelopments have ultimately 
worked to exclude the poorest public housing residents, the large majority 
of whom are racial minorities, primarily because these groups 
disproportionately bear the burden of extreme poverty. Once-distressed 
neighborhoods are on track to become as segregated as before, though the 
racial pendulum has swung in the opposite direction. The poor and 
 
2  The Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority litigation in Chicago provides one particularly 
prominent example. See 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969). 
3  A congressionally authorized study conducted between 1989 and 1992 found that 6% of the 
nation’s public housing stock was in a state of severe distress. It is this portion—located almost entirely 
in urban areas—that will be the primary focus of this Comment. 
4  Notice of Funding Availability for Revitalization of Severely Distressed Public Housing; HOPE 
VI Revitalization and Demolition Grants, Fiscal Year 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,178, 60,178 (Oct. 21, 2003) 
[hereinafter Notice of Funding Availability]. 
5  See MAGGIE MCCARTY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HOPE VI: BACKGROUND, FUNDING, AND 
ISSUES 7–10 (2005), available at http://alexandriava.gov/uploadedFiles/planning/info/ 
CRSBriefingonHopeVI.pdf (showing that Congress appropriated more than $6 billion in funds to HOPE 
VI between 1993 and 2005). 
6  G. Thomas Kingsley, Taking Advantage of What We Have Learned, in FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE: 
HOPE VI AND THE NEW PROMISE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN AMERICA’S CITIES 263, 265 (Henry G. 
Cisneros & Lora Engdahl eds., 2009) [hereinafter FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE].  
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displaced have increasingly resettled in outlying communities that are no 
less racially and socially isolated than the places they left. HOPE VI thus 
produces a neighborhood dynamic that appears to be incompatible with 
long-run integration. In light of these unfortunate outcomes, I will argue 
that programs advancing racial integration—the FHA chief among them—
should trump income-mixing policies—embodied by HOPE VI—when the 
compasses point in different directions. One particularly strong justification 
for reconciling the competing policy strands by reprioritizing racial 
integration is that it best promotes the interests of those who are generally 
recognized as the intended beneficiaries of national public housing policy.7 
This discussion is particularly timely because, after years of waning 
congressional support, HOPE VI will soon be a thing of the past.8 With no 
comprehensive successor program yet emerging, lawmakers have a rare 
opportunity to step back and significantly recalibrate the current direction of 
national housing policy. After making the case for the deficiencies of an 
exclusively mixed-income approach, I conclude by offering three 
integrative policies to guide public housing in a new and more beneficial 
direction. 
The argument will proceed in four Parts. Part I explores the genesis of 
the modern public housing program, the historical entrenchment of both 
segregation and extreme poverty in urban projects, and the various agendas 
that have dominated national housing policy since 1937. Part II focuses on 
the modern rise of HOPE VI in response to the social and physical distress 
of urban public housing after the 1970s. It takes an especially critical look 
at the program’s underlying mixed-income principle, which seeks to 
remedy the harms occasioned by concentrated poverty in public housing. It 
 
7  A central purpose of HOPE VI, for instance, is to “[i]mprove the living environment for public 
housing residents of severely distressed public housing projects.” Notice of Funding Availability, supra 
note 4, at 60,178; see also HUD’s Public Housing Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/rental_assistance/phprog (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) 
(“Public housing was established to provide decent and safe rental housing for eligible low-income 
families, the elderly, and persons with disabilities.”). That distressed projects are (or were) populated 
almost entirely by poor racial minorities in urban areas is no secret—a point taken up throughout the rest 
of this Comment. Thus, it is no stretch to say that the statutorily designated beneficiaries are 
characterized by two salient and intertwined features: their membership in a minority group and their 
extreme poverty. 
8  Funding in fiscal year 2010 was just $124 million, less than 20% of the amount allocated a decade 
earlier. See infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. Lawmakers are exploring small-scale successor 
programs to HOPE VI, including the new “Choice Neighborhoods” program. See Choice 
Neighborhoods: History and HOPE, EVIDENCE MATTERS (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. Office of 
Policy Dev. and Research), Winter 2011, at 1, 3; see also Choice Neighborhoods, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. 
& URBAN DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/ 
programs/ph/cn (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) (“Choice Neighborhoods grants build upon the successes of 
public housing transformation under HOPE VI to provide support for the preservation and rehabilitation 
of public and HUD-assisted housing, within the context of a broader approach to concentrated 
poverty.”). 
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also introduces the Cabrini-Green neighborhood in Chicago, which was 
redeveloped using HOPE VI funds, to illuminate the most abstract concepts 
and ground discussion of the legal and social implications of income-
mixing policies. Part III describes the inevitable points of conflict between 
these policies and policies aimed at promoting racial integration—the FHA 
in particular. It argues that the inadvertent consequences of income-mixing 
policies often work against the interests of the intended principal 
beneficiaries of national housing policy and therefore ought to give way. 
Part IV concludes by making the normative case for reaffirming racial 
integration as a primary policy goal and suggests three mechanisms for 
affirmatively furthering the goal of integrated housing embodied in the 
FHA. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. HOUSING POLICY 
The story of public housing in urban America is a long and, at least in 
its later chapters, tragic one. This Part traces that story from its beginnings 
to its contemporary state, culminating in HOPE VI. It also describes how 
the particular segment of public housing that is the subject of this Comment 
came to be overwhelmingly poor and racially segregated, problems that 
have inspired competing policy prescriptions over the past few decades. 
A. Historical Developments 
Congress first created the modern public housing program when it 
passed the Housing Act of 1937 (1937 Act),9 which followed the shock of 
the Great Depression.10 At that time, Congress introduced an enduring two-
tiered system that vested “control over the scope and direction of public 
housing” in the federal government,11 but left implementation to local 
public housing authorities (PHAs).12 Municipalities across the nation 
 
9  United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1437–1439 (2006)). Even this first piece of public housing legislation was the subject of 
“vociferous objections,” foreshadowing decades of tumult. GAIL RADFORD, MODERN HOUSING FOR 
AMERICA 189 (1996); see also Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: 
The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 896 (1990) (“From its inception, public housing 
was controversial.”). 
10  For a thorough reconstruction of the political forces that gave rise to the 1937 Act and the 
subsequent tug-of-war over its progressive legacy (with a special eye toward Chicago), see D. 
BRADFORD HUNT, BLUEPRINT FOR DISASTER: THE UNRAVELING OF CHICAGO PUBLIC HOUSING 15–34 
(2009). 
11  Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons from Chicago’s 
Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 117, 126 (2009). 
12  See id.; see also Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go from Here?, 
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 497, 499–500 & n.11 (1993) (“A public housing authority is a municipal corporation 
created pursuant to state enabling legislation. Typically, a PHA is governed by a board of 
commissioners appointed by the mayor and city council of the jurisdiction in which it is located.”). 
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subsequently established their own PHAs to construct and operate local 
developments using federal funds made available under the 1937 Act.13 The 
new plan for public housing encountered stiff resistance from private 
interests that feared competition from the federal government in the housing 
market.14 In response, Congress mandated that public housing developments 
authorized by the 1937 Act “be modestly designed and constructed in order 
to ensure that the program would be limited to low-income people.”15 
After World War II slowed construction, Congress revived the federal 
public housing program with the Housing Act of 1949 (1949 Act)16 to 
provide apartments for those displaced by slum clearance.17 Congress 
accordingly authorized PHAs to construct 810,000 additional units of 
public housing.18 Just as importantly, Congress took occasion to declare that 
providing “a decent home and a suitable living environment for every 
American family” was a matter of national housing policy.19 The luster of 
that promise, however, faded in time, as it took more than two decades to 
complete all of the authorized units.20 
During this twenty-year period, the physical and social distress in 
urban public housing began to accelerate. Projects in cities across the nation 
became closely associated with urban decay, rampant crime, and social 
 
13  See Peter Kivisto, A Historical Review of Changes in Public Housing Policies and Their Impacts 
on Minorities, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND MINORITY HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 4 (Jamshid A. 
Momeni ed., 1986); see also Schill, supra note 12, at 499–500 (“Under the Housing Act of 1937, local 
public housing authorities (‘PHAs’), rather than the federal government, build, own, and operate 
housing for low and moderate income households. Once a municipality decides to participate in the 
program, it establishes a PHA, which executes an Annual Contributions Contract with the federal 
government. Under the contract, the PHA funds the purchase of land and the capital costs of the housing 
by issuing long term bonds . . . . The federal government agrees to make all interest payments on the 
bonds, effectively underwriting the full capital cost of the development.” (footnotes omitted)). 
14  See Cara Hendrickson, Racial Desegregation and Income Deconcentration in Public Housing, 
9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 35, 37 (2002). 
15  Id. 
16  Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.). 
17  See Schill, supra note 12, at 500; see also Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial 
Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 
1285, 1292, 1294 (1995) (noting that this mandate assured an “influx of very poor households” into 
public housing). 
18  See J. Paul Mitchell, Historical Overview of Direct Federal Housing Assistance, in FEDERAL 
HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT 187, 195 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985); see also 
Kivisto, supra note 13, at 5. This number represented an impressive expansion of the public housing 
program, considering only 135,000 units were built in the sixteen years leading up to the 1949 Act. Id. 
19  Housing Act of 1949, § 2. 
20  See Mitchell, supra note 18, at 195; see also Schill, supra note 9, at 895–96 (noting that it took 
until 1972 to construct all of the additional units promised in the 1949 Act). 
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isolation.21 PHAs found themselves largely powerless to stem the tide of 
decline in public housing. Their operation and maintenance budgets, which 
were funded by rent, had dwindled due to increasingly poor tenants unable 
to pay sufficient amounts. At the same time, Congress remained unwilling 
to provide operational subsidies for the units it authorized.22 These financial 
troubles, compounding the perceived failures of public housing, ultimately 
led President Nixon to declare a moratorium on housing program activity in 
1972.23 The weight of administrative scandals, changing political winds, 
crumbling infrastructure, and persistent “white resistance to residential 
integration” all played a role in the declaration.24 
It quickly became clear that the moratorium’s impact would not be 
limited to mere changes in proposed construction. On the broadest level, the 
moratorium also ushered in a new era in public housing policy largely 
dominated by the free market and private development.25 The introduction 
of the Section 8 program in 1974 was particularly emblematic of this 
move.26 Upon authorizing a voucher system to aid low-income families, the 
federal government began subsidizing the rent of qualifying tenants who 
opted to live in privately-owned units.27 The Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit (LIHTC) program followed in 1986.28 It focused on encouraging the 
 
21  Alexander von Hoffman, A Study in Contradictions: The Origins and Legacy of the Housing Act 
of 1949, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 299, 315–20 (2000) (“Despite the fact that most public housing 
functioned well, a few failed projects colored the image of the entire program.”). 
22  See R. ALLEN HAYS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING 99–100 (3d ed. 2012) 
(explaining how the dual pressures of aging buildings in need of more repairs and lower rental payments 
created serious financial difficulties for PHAs). 
23  Id. at 134–38. The entire political history surrounding the moratorium is, of course, significantly 
more complex than what is described above, but such a far-reaching discussion falls outside the scope of 
this Comment. For a complete treatment of the subject, see id. at 107–38. 
24  Id. at 107–11, 130–34. Author R. Allen Hays describes the public housing program, plagued by 
policy and political disputes after the Johnson Administration, as a “ship [that] was standing on the 
launching pad, with plenty of fuel and a seemingly clear flight path charted, [when] the captaincy 
changed hands and the crew was still deeply divided on the basic direction it should take.” Id. at 108. 
25  See Schill, supra note 12, at 500 (“At that time, the federal government changed directions in 
housing policy and began to subsidize private developers of low-income housing.”). 
26  Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 8, 88 Stat. 633, 662–
66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006)). Section 8 was a major feature of the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974. See id. (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
27  See § 1437f. Section 8 thus provides tenant-based assistance. Once voucher recipients find a 
participating private landlord, the tenant must pay a fixed percentage of the household’s income in rent 
while the government pays the landlord the balance. See Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the 
Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 UCLA L. REV. 983, 986 (2010). Reliance on private developers to 
remedy public problems was part and parcel of the emerging conservative narrative in American politics 
at the time. See generally HAYS, supra note 22, at 139–47 (explaining in detail the political roots of the 
housing policy evolution that occurred from 1973 to 1980). The Section 8 program—with only minor 
adjustments—survives to this day. 
28  Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252, 100 Stat. 2085, 2189–2208 (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 42 (2006)). 
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private “development and rehabilitation of housing for low-income 
households.”29 Meanwhile, funding levels for traditional public housing fell 
precipitously during the Reagan years,30 leaving the nation saddled with a 
deteriorated physical stock of public housing, poor on-site management, 
and frayed relationships between many PHAs and their residents by the end 
of the 1980s.31 
One constant throughout these decades of policy upheaval was the 
unshakeable legacy of racial discrimination in urban public housing 
projects. Indeed, these projects bore the mark of segregation almost from 
inception.32 PHAs largely operated their housing units according to the 
segregationist norms that dominated federal policy and the private housing 
market at the time.33 By the 1950s and 1960s, municipalities and PHAs had 
begun relegating the poorest households to spatially and socially isolated 
units through siting policies that located new construction in parts of town 
struggling with segregation.34 One consequence was to further entrench 
existing patterns of racial separation in urban centers. At the same time, 
demographic upheaval, notably the suburban flight of moderate-income 
white families and the northern migration of blacks from the Deep South, 
significantly altered the character of most urban projects.35 Public housing 
 
29  Florence Wagman Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
Program and the Civil Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1998) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Florence Roisman, noting that the program became “the only game in town” after Reagan’s 
substantial overhaul of federal housing policy, provides a complete assessment of program particulars in 
her article. See id. 
30  See HAYS, supra note 22, at 235–37. The withdrawal of federal financial support for housing was 
a part of broader budget cuts undertaken by the Reagan Administration. See id. 
31  See Harry J. Wexler, HOPE VI: Market Means/Public Ends—The Goals, Strategies, and Midterm 
Lessons of HUD’s Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 195, 200–01 (2001). 
32  See Kivisto, supra note 13, at 4–5. The federal government operated public housing on the basis 
of de jure racial segregation almost from the start. See 2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: 
THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 622–27 (Transaction Publishers 1996) (1944) 
(explaining that the power of public opinion pressured housing authorities to segregate public housing). 
33  See MYRDAL, supra note 32, at 625–26; Florence Wagman Roisman, Keeping the Promise: 
Ending Racial Discrimination and Segregation in Federally Financed Housing, 48 HOW. L.J. 913, 917–
18 (2005) (“From the creation of federally financed public housing under the Public Works 
Administration in 1933, through the enactment of the U.S. Housing Act in 1937, to the adoption of Title 
VI in 1964, ‘public housing was de jure segregated. These projects were operated according to a Public 
Housing Administration ([federal] “PHA”) policy of “separate but equal.”’ Although one might have 
thought that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education clearly signaled the 
unconstitutionality of government-imposed racial segregation, federal housing officials disregarded the 
implications of Brown for the housing programs.” (footnotes omitted)). 
34  See Schill & Wachter, supra note 17, at 1295; see also von Hoffman, supra note 21, at 315 (“In 
response to site controversies, housing authorities built new housing projects near old ones, thus 
concentrating public housing in certain working- and lower-class areas of the city. As a result, the 
construction of new projects often reinforced old racial ghettos.”). 
35  Cf. Douglas S. Massey, The New Geography of Inequality in Urban America, in RACE, POVERTY, 
AND DOMESTIC POLICY 173, 174–79 (C. Michael Henry ed., 2004) (documenting the social and 
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became recognized as “a permanent home to a very poor and 
disproportionately nonwhite population.”36 To be sure, the federal 
government played no small part in this development. The government 
sanctioned residential segregation through explicitly discriminatory policies 
in the early years of the public housing program and indifference to local 
discrimination in later years.37 All of this led the Civil Rights Commission 
to conclude that “the [f]ederal [g]overnment has been . . . most influential in 
creating and maintaining urban residential segregation.”38 
The legacy of extreme poverty in public housing developed over much 
the same period. From the beginning, Congress debated whether public 
housing should be reserved for the very poorest Americans or whether it 
should accommodate members of different income groups.39 Indeed, early 
congressional rhetoric suggests these developments were initially intended 
to serve as temporary housing for the working poor.40 The vision of a 
compassionate stopover for the “deserving” poor (i.e., the submerged 
middle class), however, failed to materialize in any significant way.41 The 
1949 Act seemed to concede that public housing was instead the exclusive 
domain of the most destitute Americans.42 Consequently, “[l]ocal 
 
geographic disparity between white and black communities that grew tremendously starting in the 
1950s). 
36  Schill, supra note 9. According to Schill, white flight and subsequent changes in the inner city 
were not simply an organic process; he notes that active “[f]ederal government policies and 
programs . . . subsidized the movement of middle and moderate income households out of the city to the 
suburbs.” Id. For another view on the changing character of public housing after the 1949 Act, see 
LAWRENCE J. VALE, RECLAIMING PUBLIC HOUSING 5–6 (2002). 
37  See Hendrickson, supra note 14, at 43–47. 
38  U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Twenty Years After Brown: Equal Opportunity in Housing 39 
(1975). 
39  Schill & Wachter, supra note 17, at 1293–94 (“The 1937 Housing Act reflects the ambivalence 
that members of Congress felt over who should live in public housing.”). 
40  Congress originally pitched the idea of public housing as a temporary refuge for the “submerged 
middle class” struggling to cope with the Great Depression. See Schill, supra note 12, at 510 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The rhetorical distinction between the “deserving” poor—generally 
conceptualized as hardworking citizens who have temporarily fallen on hard times—and the 
“undeserving” poor—often minority households headed by a single female—is a politically potent one, 
especially in the realm of public housing. See, e.g., Robyn Minter Smyers, High Noon in Public 
Housing: The Showdown Between Due Process Rights and Good Management Practices in the War on 
Drugs and Crime, 30 URB. LAW. 573, 579–80 (1998). 
41  Despite public appeals to the submerged middle class, “it was assumed from the beginning that 
only the very lowest income persons, those so desperately poor as to have no chance of obtaining 
housing on the private market, should be served.” HAYS, supra note 22, at 93. 
42  See Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 301, 63 Stat. 413, 422–23 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006)) (requiring PHAs to select “families having the most urgent housing needs” 
and to ensure both that an applicant’s “net family income” did not exceed a predetermined “maximum 
income limit[]” and that the applicant had “lived in an unsafe, insanitary or overcrowded dwelling, or 
was to be displaced by another low-rent housing project or by a public slum-clearance or redevelopment 
project, or actually was without housing”); see also Hendrickson, supra note 14, at 40 (“With the 
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governments and PHAs . . . acted to promote the concentration and isolation 
of very poor households in public housing through their siting policies and 
management practices.”43 And this concentration and isolation would lead 
directly to an innovative new housing policy known as HOPE VI. 
B. Introducing HOPE VI 
America’s inner cities experienced a period of intense crisis in the late 
1980s and early 1990s as the burden of extreme poverty, rampant crime, 
and racial isolation weighed on millions.44 Scenes of severely distressed 
public housing and “the hopelessness and wasted human potential of the 
residents living [there]” became familiar.45 Congress responded to the crisis 
in 1989 when it established the National Commission on Severely 
Distressed Public Housing (Commission).46 Congress asked the 
Commission to “explore the factors contributing to structural, economic, 
and social distress; identify strategies for remediation; and propose a 
national action plan to eradicate distressed conditions by the year 2000.”47 
The Commission ultimately found that 6% of the nation’s public housing 
was in the direst of straits.48 Residents of these units were paralyzed by fear 
of widespread neighborhood crime, incapable of securing meaningful 
employment, confined to unsafe and unsanitary units, and unable to access 
much-needed self-sufficiency programs.49 
 
passage of the 1949 Act, Congress sent a message that public housing would be reserved for the poorest 
citizens.”). 
43  Schill & Wachter, supra note 17, at 1295. 
44  See Bruce Katz, The Origins of HOPE VI, in FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE, supra note 6, at 15, 16–17. 
Among the most notable and devastating consequences of concentrated poverty are economic 
disadvantage, high crime rates, and overall social dislocation. See Schill, supra note 12, at 519–22 
(describing the groundbreaking scholarship of William Julius Wilson on the subject of “concentrated 
ghetto poverty”). 
45  Mindy Turbov, Public Housing Redevelopment as a Tool for Revitalizing Neighborhoods: How 
and Why Did It Happen and What Have We Learned?, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 167, 177 (2006). The 
tragedy of public housing did not escape public attention in the nation’s major media outlets. See, e.g., 
Kevin Johnson, For Kids, Nowhere to Hide: Gunfire Part of Life in Chicago Projects, USA TODAY, 
Oct. 15, 1992, at 3A; Patrick T. Reardon, CHA Reeling from Years of Maintenance Neglect, CHI. TRIB., 
Nov. 2, 1992, § 2, at 1. It should be noted that part of Congress’s sudden urgency in dealing with the 
crisis likely derived from the “pervasive notion that federal policies had contributed to [the worsening] 
conditions” in inner cities. Katz, supra note 44, at 20. 
46  See Department of Housing and Urban Development Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-235, 
§§ 501–507, 103 Stat. 1987, 2048–52. 
47  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-98-187, HOPE VI: PROGRESS AND 
PROBLEMS IN REVITALIZING DISTRESSED PUBLIC HOUSING 3 (1998). 
48  NAT’L COMM’N ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUB. HOUS., THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUBLIC HOUSING: A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE 
SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 2 (1992) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
49  See Turbov, supra note 45, at 177. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 48 (laying out in full 
the Commission’s findings and recommendations). 
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Based on its findings, the Commission released its final report in 1992 
that included detailed recommendations in the three areas of greatest 
national concern: the needs of residents, the physical condition of 
developments, and management operations.50 Congress then designed the 
HOPE VI program to implement the recommendations under the direction 
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).51 The 
program aimed to change both the physical configuration of public 
housing—designing new buildings and site plans—and social outcomes in 
poor neighborhoods—promoting resident self-sufficiency through positive 
incentives, partnerships with community organizations, and access to 
comprehensive services.52 The broad agenda seemingly underscored an 
implicit recognition that the government needed to redefine its role in 
public housing and neighborhood development in order to meet the needs of 
a significant share of the urban poor. HOPE VI accomplished this by 
providing federal grants to PHAs to revitalize distressed public housing 
projects.53 
Such an ambitious program did not come particularly cheaply or easily. 
From 1993 through 1998, the program remained unauthorized and therefore 
reliant on annual appropriations bills for funding that ultimately totaled 
more than $3 billion.54 Congress finally authorized HOPE VI when it passed 
the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA).55 
Funding for HOPE VI, however, decreased dramatically in the ensuing 
 
50  See FINAL REPORT, supra note 48, at 10–25. 
51  See Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent 
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571, 1579–81 (1992) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1437 (2006)). The HOPE acronym, which stands for “Homeownership and Opportunity for 
People Everywhere,” was originally borrowed from a series of grant programs under the Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, Pub. L. No 101-625 (1990). See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 
356, at 40 (1992). The acronym has stuck though it is at least a little descriptively inaccurate. 
52  See Janet L. Smith, Public Housing Transformation: Evolving National Policy, in WHERE ARE 
POOR PEOPLE TO LIVE?: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES 19, 32–33 (Larry Bennett et 
al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter WHERE ARE POOR PEOPLE TO LIVE?]. 
53  See MCCARTY, supra note 5, at 5–9. HOPE VI grants have taken one of five forms: revitalization 
grants, planning grants, demolition-only grants, “Neighborhood Networks” grants, and “Main Street” 
grants. Id. at 5. Of these forms, revitalization is by far the largest category. See About HOPE VI, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/ 
public_indian_housing/programs/ph/hope6/about (last visited Aug 15, 2012) (showing that revitalization 
grants account for more than 90% of funds awarded through HOPE VI). For this reason, revitalization is 
the sole focus of this Comment. 
54  See MCCARTY, supra note 5, at 4, 7. For a yearly breakdown of HOPE VI appropriations from 
1993 to 2004, see id. at 7 tbl.1. 
55  Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). QHWRA authorized HOPE VI through the 
conclusion of 2002. Id. Since then, Congress has reauthorized funding for HOPE VI each fiscal year. 
For a complete discussion of the QHWRA’s implications, see Terry A.C. Gray, De-Concentrating 
Poverty and Promoting Mixed-Income Communities in Public Housing: The Quality Housing and Work 
Responsibility Act of 1998, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 173 (1999). 
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years, from $570 million in fiscal year 2003 to just $150 million in fiscal 
year 2004.56 Appropriation levels have never recovered, though HOPE VI 
continues to persist for now.57 All told, Congress has committed nearly $7 
billion to the program since its inception in 1993,58 more than $6.1 billion of 
which has been awarded to PHAs in the form of revitalization grants.59 
This federal investment was intended in part to radically alter the 
prevailing perception of public housing, which had become tethered to 
images of urban decay.60 Most revitalization activity thus targeted the 
“modern high-rise project” for its especially strong evocation of failed 
policy norms.61 The founding purpose of HOPE VI was to replace these 
ugly and stigmatized complexes with low-density buildings that blended 
seamlessly into the cityscape, housing families of varying income levels.62 
This particular policy innovation was predicated on “getting the private 
sector to invest in, develop, and then manage properties” that would support 
both public housing residents and market-rate renters.63 The resulting 
mixed-income, mixed-financed developments64 were supposed to represent 
a fundamental break from the ineffective policies and practices that led 
public housing to ruin.65 
 
56  See MCCARTY, supra note 5, at 7 tbl.1. 
57  See HOPE VI Appropriations and Funding History, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/#4b (last visited Aug. 15, 2012). HOPE VI 
received $124 million in the 2010 fiscal year, though future funding was recently cast into serious doubt. 
See HUD Announces Funding for HOPE VI & New Choice Neighborhood Program, APA POL’Y NEWS 
FOR PLANNERS (Aug. 27, 2010, 10:29 AM), http://blogs.planning.org/policy/?p=282; see also Dep’t of 
Hous. & Urban Dev., Public and Indian Housing: Revitalization of Severely Distressed Public Housing 
(2012), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=HOPE_VI_2012.pdf (“No funds are 
requested for the Revitalization of Severely Distressed Public Housing (HOPE VI) program in fiscal 
year 2012. Instead, [HUD] will continue to build on the success of the HOPE VI program through the 
implementation of Choice Neighborhoods . . . .”). 
58  See Grants Awarded, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/ 
programs/ph/hope6/about/#6 (last visited Aug. 15, 2012). 
59  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Awards Six Housing Authorities $113.6 
Million to Revitalize Public Housing, Transform Surrounding Neighborhood (June 1, 2010), available 
at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2010/HUDNo.10-
112. 
60  See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
61  Smith, supra note 52, at 33. 
62  This is characteristic of a design movement known as New Urbanism. See infra Part II.A. 
Economic integration, a centerpiece of HOPE VI policy, is also taken up infra Part II.A. 
63  Smith, supra note 52, at 33. This is to say nothing of the difficulty of successfully attracting 
market-rate renters who are generally middle-class and unaccustomed to living in proximity to public 
housing residents. 
64  “Mixed-finance” is a shorthand term for government “partnerships with private developers to 
create new mixed-income communities by combining HUD funding with private financing” under 
HOPE VI. Mindy Turbov & Valerie Piper, HOPE VI and Mixed-Finance Redevelopments: A Catalyst 
for Neighborhood Renewal, 15 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 27, 31 (2005). 
65  See id. at 27 (claiming that the new emphasis on leveraging private resources has “radically 
chang[ed] the urban landscape” for the better); Roger K. Lewis, Changes Improve HUD Program to 
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II. THE MIXED-INCOME APPROACH 
HOPE VI, by its own terms, is a policy prescription meant to address 
the legacy of extreme poverty in public housing, rather than the concurrent 
legacy of segregation. The program has its roots in a long-running 
congressional debate “about who should live in public housing and . . . the 
desirability of reserving public housing for the poorest in society.”66 In this 
instance, Congress chose to adopt a mixed-income approach to modern 
public housing reform, which has become the defining characteristic of the 
HOPE VI program. This Part examines the theoretical considerations 
underlying this approach and explores the questions left open by income-
mixing policies. It then introduces the example of Cabrini-Green, a recently 
redeveloped neighborhood in Chicago, to ground the discussion. 
A. Theoretical Roots 
HOPE VI, as I have suggested, is perhaps best understood as a 
response to the tremendous human costs of concentrated poverty in inner 
cities.67 The broad notion of concentrated poverty can be understood as the 
geographic isolation of very poor residents inhabiting densely-packed 
inner-city neighborhoods, often characterized by racially segregated public 
housing complexes in extreme disrepair where residents are cut off from the 
social and economic necessities of middle-class life.68 Moreover, 
concentrated poverty is in many respects a self-enforcing cycle: 
Historically, “as the poor [have gotten] poorer, so [have] the neighborhoods 
where they congregate[].”69 Mixed-income policy is thus designed to 
intervene and mitigate the factors that ensure the continued marginalization 
of isolated neighborhoods. 
The Commission confronted these factors and the general spatial 
distribution of poverty head-on in its final report.70 It expressly recognized 
that residents of isolated developments were “very poor and getting 
 
Spruce Up Urban Housing, WASH. POST, May 15, 1999, at G14 (describing how HOPE VI funds are 
used and ultimately leveraged to “catalyze revitalization”). 
66  Hendrickson, supra note 14, at 39; see discussion supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
67  The Commission’s recommendations focused almost exclusively on how to remedy conditions 
largely attributable to the effects of concentrated poverty. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 48, at 6, 9–31 
(recommending specific steps to alleviate the problems associated with concentrated poverty in 
“severely distressed public housing”); see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 
58 (1987) (describing in detail the term “concentration effects”). 
68  See Alexander Polikoff, HOPE VI and the Deconcentration of Poverty, in FROM DESPAIR TO 
HOPE, supra note 6, at 65, 65. Polikoff notes that the Robert Taylor Homes on the South Side of Chicago 
were one particularly infamous example of this phenomenon. Id. 
69  Massey, supra note 35, at 173. 
70  See FINAL REPORT, supra note 48. 
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poorer”71 and, in response, proposed allowing for an increased mix of 
incomes among households in new developments.72 Subsequent HOPE VI 
legislative reforms adopted the mixed-income notion wholesale. 
Economic integration thus became an instrumental part of national 
housing policy. The underlying theory was that neighborhoods subject to 
income mixing would “include actively employed residents to serve as role 
models and homeowners with a vested interest in the upkeep of the 
neighborhood.”73 This theory is largely derived from the work of William 
Julius Wilson, especially his seminal book, The Truly Disadvantaged. 
Wilson argued that because “concentrated ghetto poverty generates 
problems different both in kind and in magnitude from the problems poor 
people encounter in less isolated environments,”74 the most effective policy 
prescriptions would combat isolation through the presence of middle- and 
working-class families.75 He believed these families would import and share 
certain communal values with their less fortunate neighbors, and this 
exchange would ultimately cultivate social stability, mainstream norms, and 
patterns of behavior conducive to regularized employment.76 Accordingly, 
proponents have suggested that poor public housing residents will learn 
from the newly arrived moderate-income working families and proceed to 
go out and join the labor market themselves.77 
HOPE VI, in pursuing this agenda of economic integration, has also 
been informed by a design movement known generally as New Urbanism.78 
This movement is grounded in notions of spatial deconcentration and 
 
71  Id. at 47. 
72  Id. at 69–70. 
73  Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2005). 
74  Schill, supra note 12, at 519. 
75  WILSON, supra note 67, at 61. 
76  See id. at 55–62. 
77  See Hendrickson, supra note 14, at 74 (“[Mixed-income advocates] suggest that the inclusion of 
working families and those of moderate income in public housing will provide role models for poor 
public housing residents, inviting them to learn from moderate-income families and encouraging them to 
get jobs.”). 
78  New Urbanism, in many ways, is simply a set of principles that redefines more traditional notions 
of community planning. Such principles derive from a broad vision: 
In a well designed neighborhood, adults and children can walk safely to nearby shopping, schools, 
and parks. Public facilities serve as focal points for community activity. A broad range of housing 
options allow[s] a mix of family sizes, ages, incomes, and cultures to live harmoniously. Transit 
service to regional jobs is a convenient walk from home. Neighbors know each other and take a 
special sense of pride in their homes and community. Healthy neighborhoods foster positive 
community spirit that can in turn help mend old wounds and remake the city. 
CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PRINCIPLES FOR INNER 
CITY NEIGHBORHOOD DESIGN 3 (2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/ 
principles.pdf [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. Application of these principles will necessarily vary in form, 
depending on the neighborhood. 
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community continuity, which map onto the programmatic goals of HOPE 
VI with relative precision. In the context of HOPE VI, the fundamental 
thrust of New Urbanism is to transform isolated high-rise projects into low-
density mixed-income developments that reflect and interact with the 
surrounding area, both physically and socially.79 What results, in theory at 
least, are safe neighborhood spaces that facilitate daily interaction among 
members of various income groups.80 Indeed, these very interactions anchor 
the role model theory of income-mixing policies. 
Another hallmark of the HOPE VI program is its reliance on private 
developers. This mixed-finance approach carves out a significant role for 
the private sector in public housing redevelopment.81 More concretely, 
PHAs are encouraged to collaborate with private firms in the construction, 
management, and ownership of new developments.82 The Commission 
professed a belief that “public housing residents; [f]ederal, [s]tate, and local 
governments; housing authorities; and other public and private community-
based organizations can change the landscape of severely distressed public 
housing developments” if they only worked together.83 PHAs have 
subsequently carried out thousands of redevelopments relying in part on 
private financing. This fact becomes particularly significant in the context 
of setting and enforcing income-based admissions policies, which largely 
determine the profitability and sustainability of any given HOPE VI 
redevelopment.84 
B. Some Open Questions 
The biggest question left open by an income-mixing policy approach is 
what happens to the poor public housing residents who are excluded from 
new mixed-income developments to make room for higher income movers. 
This question has bedeviled HOPE VI proponents nearly everywhere 
reforms have been undertaken. And the problem is not an insignificant one: 
indeed, HOPE VI developers must not only accommodate higher income 
 
79  See Peter Calthorpe, HOPE VI and New Urbanism, in FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE, supra note 6, at 
49, 51–53. Unlike the projects being replaced, such spaces do not admit of visual boundaries separating 
the “good” from the “bad.” See Ngai Pindell, Is There Hope for HOPE VI?: Community Economic 
Development and Localism, 35 CONN. L. REV. 385, 420–21 (2003). 
80  See PRINCIPLES, supra note 78; see also Pindell, supra note 79 (applying the principles of New 
Urbanism to HOPE VI redevelopments). 
81  See 24 C.F.R. § 941.600(a)(1) (2006); see also Turbov & Piper, supra note 64 (arguing that 
HOPE VI has been successful in revitalizing many communities largely because it has attracted new 
private investment). 
82  § 941.600(a)(1). 
83  FINAL REPORT, supra note 48, at xiv. But see Note, When Hope Falls Short: HOPE VI, 
Accountability, and the Privatization of Public Housing, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (2003) (arguing that 
privatization of public goods and services, like public housing, suffers from systematic deficiencies). 
84  See infra Part III.A.3. 
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residents, but must do so with fewer gross units than before because of the 
emphasis on low-density construction. Locking out residents most in need 
of help may thus exacerbate the very problem income mixing purports to 
solve. 
Larger questions about the actualization of the (theoretical) social and 
economic benefits of neighborhood income mixing also persist.85 Some 
commentators suggest that the poorest public housing residents neither 
welcome nor stand to gain from the arrival of higher income neighbors.86 
These suggestions impliedly distrust the soundness of the role model theory 
in areas afflicted by concentrated poverty.87 
Finally, there are questions about the interaction and impact of income-
mixing policies on the continued efforts to promote residential racial 
integration. While the Commission chose not to address such issues, the 
legacy of segregation hangs uncomfortably in the background. The extent to 
which income-mixing theory can facilitate, or at least not stand in the way 
of, efforts to engage the root causes of segregation, some of which are 
common to the legacy of concentrated poverty, is a primary concern.88 
C. HOPE VI in Chicago 
At this point, an example may help illuminate some of the more 
abstract principles that underpin mixed-income policy and the problems that 
such a policy encounters in practice—especially where it intersects with 
historical segregation in public housing. Among major metropolitan areas, 
Chicago offers perhaps the best vantage point for assessing the on-the-
ground realities of HOPE VI. The city’s decades-long struggle with racial 
segregation in public housing is a tragedy well documented.89 By the middle 
part of the last century, virtually every existing development in Chicago 
could be found in a neighborhood that was at least 84% black and 
desperately poor.90 The policies and practices that simultaneously 
concentrated and isolated impoverished households in predominantly black 
 
85  For a particularly thorough and convincing critique of mixed-income policy, see Ellickson, supra 
note 27. 
86  See, e.g., id. at 1012–16. 
87  See infra notes 191–96 and accompanying text. 
88  See Pindell, supra note 79, at 388 (“[HOPE VI] raises concerns about the effects of race 
consideration (or lack of consideration) in policy formation, the extent of policy engagement with 
genuine structural barriers to integration, and the connection of policies to market-based foundations.”). 
89  See, e.g., ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF SEGREGATION, 
HOUSING, AND THE BLACK GHETTO (2006); Michael H. Schill, Chicago’s Mixed-Income New 
Communities Strategy: The Future Face of Public Housing?, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND URBAN 
REDEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 135 (Willem Van Vliet ed., 1997). 
90  See ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE & HOUSING IN CHICAGO 1940–
1960, at 242–43 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1998) (1983). 
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neighborhoods have been aptly described as “the ghettoization of public 
housing.”91 This was no accident, as the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) 
and city council institutionalized racially discriminatory practices over 
many years.92 
Residents took to the courts to challenge these practices, particularly 
site-selection and tenant-assignment plans. They eventually won a landmark 
victory in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,93 which produced a 
judicial order in 1969 that imposed geographic restrictions on the 
construction of new public housing in areas with a significant percentage of 
black residents.94 To this day, Gautreaux forms the backdrop for new 
housing-development activity in Chicago. 
Much of the damage, however, had already been done. Existing high-
rise projects exacerbated racial isolation and the concentration of poverty 
with predictably dire social consequences, underscored by, among other 
things, a dramatic rise in violent crime rates.95 Worsening conditions led the 
 
91  See Schill & Wachter, supra note 17, at 1296. 
92  At a transformative time for public housing following World War II, Chicago’s leaders were 
intent on keeping black residents from moving into white neighborhoods. The mayor and city council 
effectively encouraged the ghettoization of public housing (a legacy in Chicago and among the worst in 
the nation) by consistently “defeat[ing] any integration efforts attempted by the CHA.” William Mullen, 
The Road to Hell: For Cabrini-Green, It Was Paved with Good Intentions, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1985, at 
H11; see also HAYS, supra note 22, at 132–34 (describing the “policy of massive resistance” pursued by 
Mayor Richard J. Daley and the city council in the wake of efforts to integrate public housing). For a 
thorough overview of the forces that pushed public housing developments to Chicago’s ghettos between 
1963 and 1971, see Frederick Aaron Lazin, The Failure of Federal Enforcement of Civil Rights 
Regulations in Public Housing, 1963–1971: The Co-optation of a Federal Agency by Its Local 
Constituency, 4 POL’Y SCI. 263 (1973). 
93  304 F. Supp. 736, 738–39 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority spawned an 
extensive web of judicial decisions and orders beginning in 1967. See Joseph Seliga, Comment, 
Gautreaux a Generation Later: Remedying the Second Ghetto or Creating the Third?, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1049, 1056 & n.36 (2000) (“The Gautreaux case against the CHA is made up of many different 
opinions that have been handed down since 1967. The initial opinions relate to the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth 
Amendment claims regarding the discriminatory site selection and tenant assignment plans of the CHA. 
The remaining opinions relate to issues regarding the implementation of the judgment order that was 
handed down by the court as the remedy for the violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.”). The 
residents successfully charged that CHA sited “public housing projects almost exclusively within 
neighborhoods the racial composition of which was all or substantially all Negro at the time the sites 
were acquired, for the purpose of, or with the result of, maintaining existing patterns of urban residential 
segregation by race.” Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1967). For the full 
story of the decades-long Gautreaux litigation, see POLIKOFF, supra note 89. 
94  Gautreaux, 304 F. Supp. at 738–39. The district court entered the order to implement its earlier 
judgment that the CHA had committed a constitutional violation by “intentionally cho[osing] sites for 
family public housing and adopt[ing] tenant assignment procedures . . . for the purpose of maintaining 
existing patterns of residential separation of races in Chicago.” Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. 
Supp. 907, 908 (N.D. Ill. 1969); see also Gautreaux, 304 F. Supp. at 737 (declaring that the court’s 
order was necessary to stop the CHA from continuing unconstitutional practices). 
95  See Katz, supra note 44, at 16–17; see generally SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL., THE HIDDEN WAR: 
CRIME AND THE TRAGEDY OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO 25–27 (2000) (noting that most 
policymakers and researchers “agree that the physical and social isolation of many large [public 
housing] developments contributed greatly” to the prevalence of crime and drug trafficking). 
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federal government to stage an unprecedented intervention in 1995, when 
HUD took control of CHA.96 
1. The Plan for Transformation.—HUD and the city worked to 
realize a momentous change in direction for public housing in the four 
years that followed.97 This process culminated in 1999 when HUD handed 
the reins back to CHA.98 As a condition of federal withdrawal, CHA 
adopted the “Plan for Transformation” (Plan),99 a citywide blueprint for 
redeveloping and reformulating public housing using funding from HOPE 
VI grants.100 CHA still calls the Plan “the largest, most ambitious 
redevelopment effort of public housing in the United States.”101 The 
overarching purpose of the Plan is to rehabilitate or redevelop Chicago’s 
entire stock of public housing in accord with mixed-income principles.102 In 
practice, this has meant demolishing 51 dilapidated high-rises across the 
city to be replaced by approximately 25,000 housing units in newly 
constructed rowhouses and low-rise buildings.103 According to system-wide 
goals, these units will be apportioned evenly among low-income public 
housing residents, moderate-income residents eligible for subsidized 
“affordable housing,” and market-rate buyers or renters.104 HUD initially 
 
96  See, e.g., Joel Kaplan & Flynn McRoberts, Officially, HUD Takes Over CHA: Cleveland Housing 
Boss May Get Top Job, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1995, § 1, at 1; Flynn McRoberts, New CHA Boss Has 
Hard Task: He’ll Try to Rebuild Faith, Funds, Dreams, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 1995, § 4, at 1; Steve Mills 
& Blair Kamin, CHA Is Biggest Challenge for U.S. Housing Official, CHI. TRIB., May 29, 1995, § 1, at 
6; Rep. Collins Confirms CHA Takeover, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 1995, § 1, at 1. Problems with 
“widespread mismanagement” also contributed to CHA’s takeover. See Pam Belluck, Chicago Regains 
Control of Housing Agency, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1999, at A11. 
97  See Janet L. Smith, The Chicago Housing Authority’s Plan for Transformation, in WHERE ARE 
POOR PEOPLE TO LIVE?, supra note 52, at 93, 97–101. 
98  See, e.g., Belluck, supra note 96 (noting Chicago still faced a “daunting” task in moving residents 
from crumbling high-rises to better neighborhoods with better units). 
99  CHI. HOUS. AUTH., PLAN FOR TRANSFORMATION (2000), available at http://www.thecha.org/ 
filebin/pdf/FY2000-Annual-Plan.pdf [hereinafter CHA PLAN]. For an excellent assessment of the Plan’s 
successes and failures during its first decade of operation, see Lawrence J. Vale & Erin Graves, The 
Chicago Housing Authority’s Plan for Transformation: What Does the Research Show So Far? (June 8, 
2010), available at http://web.mit.edu/dusp/dusp_extension_unsec/people/faculty/ljv/vale_macarthur_ 
2010.pdf. 
100  See Larry Bennett, Restructuring the Neighborhood: Public Housing Redevelopment and 
Neighborhood Dynamics in Chicago, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 54, 57–58 
(2000). 
101  The Plan for Transformation, CHI. HOUS. AUTH., http://www.thecha.org/pages/the_plan_for_ 
transformation/22.php (last visited Aug. 15, 2012). 
102  See id.; see generally Smith, supra note 97, at 93 (providing a historical survey of the events that 
led to the introduction of the Plan and the political and philosophical forces driving it). 
103  See CHA PLAN, supra note 99, at 2. 
104  See John Handley, Redeveloping Public Housing: CHA Aims for Integration, Not Isolation, in 
Demolishing and Replacing High-Rises, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 2004, § 16, at 1 (“The new developments 
are designed for mixed-income residents. Only about a third of the residents will be public housing 
tenants, most from the old project. Another third will be subsidized, moderate-income residents and the 
remaining third will be market-rate buyers or renters.”). Public housing residents consist of those who 
earn less than half of the area’s median income. See NAT’L HOUS. LAW PROJECT, FALSE HOPE: A 
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committed $1.5 billion in HOPE VI funds to CHA over a period of ten 
years to make the Plan a reality.105 
Development associated with the Plan is ongoing today, although the 
proposed end date passed in 2009. Nearly all of the high-rises, however, 
have long since vanished and, with them, the most imposing reminders of 
CHA’s sordid past. 
2. The Cabrini-Green Neighborhood.—The Plan has effected a 
profound transformation in many Chicago neighborhoods. One such 
example is Cabrini-Green on the Near North Side of Chicago.106 This 
neighborhood offers a unique and close-up opportunity to assess the 
reorganization of space and people resulting from aggressive mixed-income 
development. It will also help ground a discussion of the problematic legal 
implications that arise from HOPE VI developments. 
Despite modest successes in its early years,107 for much of its history 
Cabrini-Green represented everything wrong with public housing in 
America. Gangs, drugs, and violent crime were inescapable.108 Then, in 
1993, CHA received its first HOPE VI grant in the amount of $50 million to 
revitalize the area.109 Through partnership efforts with private developers,110 
townhomes began appearing along the blocks where anonymous high-rises 
 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE HOPE VI PUBLIC HOUSING REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 7–8 n.6 (June 
2002), available at http://www.nhlp.org/files/FalseHOPE.pdf. Subsidized affordable housing units are 
generally targeted at residents earning somewhere between 50% and 80% of the area’s median income. 
See, e.g., Jerry J. Salama, The Redevelopment of Distressed Public Housing: Early Results from HOPE 
VI Projects in Atlanta, Chicago, and San Antonio, 10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 95, 109 (1999). And 
market-rate renters or buyers are all of those who earn sufficient incomes, at least over 80% of the area’s 
median income, such that they do not qualify for public assistance. 
It should also be noted that the public housing transformation in Chicago entailed an overall 
reduction of about 13,000 units available to public housing residents (from 38,000 to 25,000). See 
Smith, supra note 97, at 93. The precise mix of public housing, affordable housing, and market-rate 
units varies, depending on the particular development. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
105  See Smith, supra note 97, at 93; Melita Marie Garza, CHA to Be Torn Up, Rebuilt: $1.5 Billion 
Plan Razes 51 High-Rises, Boosts Minority Firms, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 2000, § 1, at 1. 
106  The neighborhood’s generally accepted geographic boundaries are Sedgwick Street on the east, 
Chicago Avenue on the south, Halsted Street on the west, and Evergreen Avenue or Clybourn Avenue 
on the north. 
107  See generally J.S. FUERST, WHEN PUBLIC HOUSING WAS PARADISE 3 (2003) (recounting “the 
almost bucolic world of public housing in the 1940s and 1950s” in Chicago that was largely forgotten 
during its steep decline). 
108  See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Gang Gunfire May Chase Chicago Children from Their School, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1997, at A1; Don Terry, Chicago Plans Police Sweep of Troubled Housing Area, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 20, 1992, at A16. 
109  See BUS. & PROF’L PEOPLE FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, THE THIRD SIDE: A MID-COURSE REPORT 
ON CHICAGO’S TRANSFORMATION OF PUBLIC HOUSING 15 (2009), available at 
www.bpichicago.org/documents/THETHIRDSIDE.9-03-09.pdf [hereinafter BPI REPORT]. This HUD 
investment was the first of a series of commitments that would eventually culminate in the official Plan. 
See id. 
110  See, e.g., Handley, supra note 104, at 1. 
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once cast their long shadows. CHA prescribed a rigid income mix that 
departed from the citywide average to aggressively promote the integration 
of middle-class families and the deconcentration of the poorest of the poor: 
50% were made available at the market rate, 20% were designated 
“affordable for sale,” and only 30% were left for CHA tenants.111 The total 
number of public housing units in Cabrini-Green decreased from 2625 
before redevelopment to 1200 (proposed) units upon completion.112 
Dislocation has thus been an unavoidable issue. 
Though the demolition and replacement of densely populated high-
rises represents progress on many fronts, problems persist. Those residents 
unable to secure their return often do not integrate into better areas; instead, 
they tend to reconstitute ghetto-like neighborhoods farther away from the 
city center for a variety of reasons, many beyond their control.113 
Unfortunately, the abundance of social science research on tenant outcomes 
within the CHA system, and Cabrini-Green specifically, does not offer 
many clear answers.114 But it does confirm that large numbers of dislocated 
public housing residents never make it back to their original neighborhoods 
and fail to reap any substantial improvements in quality of life as a result—
unlike the lucky few who are able to return.115 
It is worth noting at this point that black households accounted for at 
least 99% of the public housing population at Cabrini-Green when the 
redevelopment process began in the early 1990s.116 Much of the housing 
reserved for moderate- and middle-income families in Cabrini-Green today 
is inhabited by an increasingly white population.117 These demographic 
 
111  See Salama, supra note 104, at 108–09 & tbl.5; Handley, supra note 104; Matthew F. Gebhardt, 
Politics, Planning and Power: Reorganizing and Redeveloping Public Housing in Chicago 174 (2009) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with author); see also BPI REPORT, supra 
note 109, at 51 (summarizing the basic goals of the Plan). 
112  BPI REPORT, supra note 109, at 61 app.A. 
113  See Seliga, supra note 93, at 1071–86 (describing this phenomenon as the creation of the “third 
ghetto” in Chicago). 
114  Compare BPI REPORT, supra note 109, at 29–30 (concluding that relocation has not gone 
smoothly for CHA residents), with SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL., URB. INST., THE CHA’S PLAN FOR 
TRANSFORMATION: HOW HAVE RESIDENTS FARED? 3 (2010), available at http://www.urban.org/ 
uploadedpdf/412190-CHAs-Plan-for-Transformation.pdf (concluding that, on balance, residents’ 
circumstances have improved since 2005). See generally LARRY BURON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV., THE HOPE VI RESIDENT TRACKING STUDY: A SNAPSHOT OF THE CURRENT LIVING 
SITUATION OF ORIGINAL RESIDENTS FROM EIGHT SITES i–ix (2002), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410591_HOPEVI_ResTrack.pdf (concluding, rather ambivalently, 
that “different housing environments offer relocatees different opportunities and challenges”). 
115  See, e.g., POPKIN ET AL., supra note 114, at 3, 5. 
116  See Salama, supra note 104, at 103–04 & tbl.3. This is a striking number, especially considering 
that in the same year, Chicago’s total population was only 33% African-American. Id. at 103. 
117  See Mapping the 2010 U.S. Census, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/census/2010/ 
map (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) (click “Zoom to a State,” select “Ill.,” drag the screen such that Chicago 
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changes have played out as CHA succeeded in economically integrating 
what was once a neighborhood of concentrated poverty.118 The interesting 
question is whether income mixing has helped ameliorate, or instead has 
further entrenched, the legacy of extreme residential segregation in Cabrini-
Green. To answer, one must look to the set of parallel housing policies 
aimed at promoting racial integration and the substantive legal mandates 
they have created. 
III. INEVITABLE COLLISION OF COMPETING POLICY STRANDS 
Some of the most important civil rights gains made in the middle part 
of the last century occurred in the area of housing policy. Foremost among 
these gains was the FHA, which explicitly combats the legacy of racial 
segregation in public housing (and the housing market generally). Because 
the FHA operates in the same sphere as income-mixing policies—despite 
addressing different problems—experience teaches us that a certain amount 
of friction is inevitable. This Part argues that, in the case of the FHA and 
HOPE VI, this friction is anything but trivial. It thus describes how the 
unintended consequences of HOPE VI and its mixed-income approach 
contravene the substantive protections of the FHA, using Cabrini-Green as 
a point of reference. It then suggests that income-mixing policies ought to 
be subordinated to racially integrative policies in order to best promote the 
interests of those who are the intended beneficiaries of national housing 
policy. 
A. Inevitable Conflict with the FHA 
Whatever the nuances of local implementation, HUD and PHAs must 
administer the HOPE VI program in accord with federal statutory 
obligations. The most important obligations emanate from Title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, better known as the FHA.119 The FHA imposes 
one positive obligation and one negative obligation that remain particularly 
significant. First, the FHA mandates that the Secretary “administer the 
programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in a 
 
is in the center, and progressively zoom to view census tracts 804, 819, and 8383, which approximate 
Cabrini-Green). 
118  See, e.g., Siobhan O’Connor, Two Tales of One City, GOOD (Feb. 11, 2008, 2:11 AM), 
http://www.good.is/post/two_tales_of_one_city (“[New housing units] are selling for up to $850,000 a 
piece. Since the Plan launched, in 2000, more than $2 billion in residential property has been sold within 
two blocks of Cabrini.”). 
119  42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2006). One commentator believes that “[i]f any lesson is to be 
learned from recent history, it is that the one tool that has been effective in ameliorating racial 
discrimination and segregation in federally assisted housing has been litigation.” Roisman, supra note 
33, at 934. 
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manner affirmatively to further the policies” of fair housing.120 Congress, in 
using this language, sought to actively promote residential integration,121 in 
part by requiring HUD to take real steps to “remove the walls of 
discrimination which enclose[d] minority groups.”122 Second, the FHA 
prohibits governmental action that discriminates on the basis of “race, 
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”123 This more modest 
provision delegitimized outwardly unequal treatment of protected classes. 
Both obligations thus mark substantive boundaries on the range of 
permissible alternatives for the transformation of distressed public housing. 
1. The “Affirmatively Further” Provision.—The FHA declares: “It is 
the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, 
for fair housing throughout the United States.”124 This promise largely relies 
on the statutory provision directing HUD to act in a manner that 
“affirmatively . . . further[s] the policies” of fair housing.125 In creating this 
obligation, Congress neglected to record what exactly it meant by the 
phrase “affirmatively . . . further.”126 Yet the context and legislative history 
of the FHA, along with subsequent attempts to define the phrase, ultimately 
point toward a requirement that HUD administer its programs in 
furtherance of actual racial integration, rather than merely refrain from 
future discrimination.127 
Judicial clarification of the textual uncertainty indeed demonstrates 
that the duty to affirmatively further fair housing means something more 
than simply nondiscrimination.128 Courts interpreting § 3608(e)(5) of the 
FHA have found that it requires HUD and PHAs to affirmatively promote 
integration and therefore consider both the racial and social implications of 
 
120  § 3608(e)(5). 
121  One sponsor remarked that the FHA would foster “truly integrated and balanced living patterns.” 
114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). 
122  114 CONG. REC. 9563 (1968) (statement of Rep. Celler). 
123  § 3604.  
124  Id. § 3601. 
125  Id. § 3608(e)(5). The FHA imposes this duty specifically on the Secretary of HUD. Id. 
126  See id. 
127  See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Elizabeth Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American Dream: 
Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 491, 
533–49 (1979) (describing this prevailing interpretation as the “substantive” one and distinguishing it 
from the alternative “pure” interpretation). 
128  See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 
908 (1978); Jorman v. Veterans Admin., 579 F. Supp. 1407 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Burney v. Hous. Auth. of 
Beaver Cnty., 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982); see also Michelle Ghaznavi Collins, Note, Opening 
Doors to Fair Housing: Enforcing the Affirmatively Further Provision of the Fair Housing Act Through 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2135, 2141–44 (2010) (discussing cases that read § 3608(e)(5) 
as requiring additional obligations—including consideration of racial and socioeconomic data in siting 
public housing—beyond the simple obligation not to discriminate in discrete instances). 
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public housing decisions.129 More explicitly, the Second Circuit held that 
this duty is only satisfied through action “taken to fulfill, as much as 
possible, the goal of open, integrated residential housing patterns and to 
prevent the increase of segregation, in ghettos, of racial groups whose lack 
of opportunities the [FHA] was designed to combat.”130 Such action 
includes, at a minimum, critically assessing the impact of a proposed 
housing decision on the “supply of genuinely open housing.”131 It also 
includes taking additional steps to ameliorate the historical legacy of 
discrimination in the housing market by private individuals and government 
actors, some of whom may be “tempted to continue to discriminate even 
though forbidden to do so by law.”132 
The judicial interpretation of the affirmatively further provision largely 
derives from the legislative history of the FHA.133 Senator Walter Mondale, 
a sponsor of the bill, remarked that the purpose of the FHA was to slow and 
replace “the rapid, block-by-block expansion of the ghetto . . . [with] truly 
integrated and balanced living patterns.”134 Accordingly, the FHA targeted 
the most entrenched policies and practices that perpetuated segregation 
through the unequal provision of housing opportunities among members of 
different races. Senator Edward Brooke, another sponsor of the bill, further 
noted that the FHA intended to remedy the “weak intentions” that led to the 
federal government directly or indirectly “sanctioning discrimination in 
housing throughout this Nation.”135 Lawmakers recognized that simply 
guarding against the most egregious kinds of discrimination would do little 
to advance the cause of integration in the face of advanced and subtle 
techniques for enforcing separation.136 Now, as then, giving substantive 
 
129  See NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 154–55 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that 
the FHA requires HUD to “do more than simply refrain from discriminating (and from purposely aiding 
discrimination by others)”); Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1125 (2d Cir. 1973); Shannon 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 820–21 (3d Cir. 1970) (stating that the FHA 
essentially prohibits total “color blindness” in housing decisions because actions that are non-
discriminatory in isolation can nevertheless increase residential segregation); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 417 (D. Md. 2005) (stating that HUD is held to a “high 
standard,” which implies “a commitment to desegregation”). 
130  Otero, 484 F.2d at 1134. 
131  NAACP, 817 F.2d at 156. 
132  Id. at 154–55. 
133  For a comprehensive overview of the legislative history of the FHA, much of which is outside 
the scope of this Comment, see Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a 
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969). 
134  114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale). But see Rubinowitz & Trosman, supra 
note 127, at 538 n.178 (suggesting the full context of the remarks may support a different reading than is 
generally accepted). 
135  114 CONG. REC. 2281 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke). 
136  The FHA attempted to establish equal rights that had some force on the ground. Cf. 114 CONG. 
REC. 9595 (1968) (statement of Rep. Pepper) (considering a bill that would use the power of the state to 
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effect to the affirmatively further provision remains the best way to 
overcome the harmful legacies of private and governmental discrimination 
and thereby satisfy the goals of the FHA.137 
In the context of Cabrini-Green, the Plan may violate this statutory 
duty to the extent that CHA did not sufficiently consider the impact of the 
new development on black residents, who were largely precluded from 
nonpublic housing units and therefore largely denied the social and 
economic benefits of a gentrifying neighborhood.138 Even a cursory glance 
at the inevitable demographic changes, brought on at first by displacement 
and later by the rising cost of living in an area adjacent to the most 
expensive neighborhoods in the city, would reveal an adverse impact on a 
large number of black residents. Indeed, only 30% of the housing in 
Cabrini-Green is “genuinely open” to poor black families who previously 
resided in segregated and ghettoized projects and do not have the means to 
occupy higher income units.139 More broadly, mixed-income developments 
will by their nature struggle to take the necessary affirmative steps because 
so many of the people harmed by the legacy of residential segregation are 
forced out to make way for market-rate renters. These housing 
developments are constructed in a way that encourages dramatic swings in 
neighborhood composition, as there was in Cabrini-Green, making it nearly 
impossible to maintain an ideal (and sustainable) level of integration 
somewhere in the middle.140 
2. The Anti-Discrimination Provision.—In addition to the positive 
obligation, the FHA also prohibits discrimination in federal housing 
 
weed out discrimination and criticizing the government’s slow-paced struggle to clearly establish 
“equal” rights). 
137  But see Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 898, 907 (8th Cir. 
2005) (discussing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004), and describing the 
prevailing interpretation as “an invasive form of judicial review”). Claiming a deferential standard of 
review, the court held it would only review HUD’s challenged decision “to assess whether HUD 
exercised its broad authority in a manner that demonstrates consideration of, and an effort to achieve, 
[tangible] results,” and not “whether HUD has, in fact achieved tangible results in the form of furthering 
opportunities for fair housing.” Id. 
138  See Cabrini-Green Local Advisory Council v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 96-C-6949, 1997 WL 
31002, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 1997) (refusing to hold that plaintiffs failed to make out a claim under 
the FHA by alleging that low-income Cabrini residents will be denied housing in their redeveloped 
neighborhood and thus “forced to live in a non-racially integrated area”). CHA was obviously aware at 
the time the Plan was conceived that any displacement arising from deconcentrating public housing units 
would fall almost entirely on black families, who compromised 99% of the public housing population in 
the neighborhood. See infra notes 162–68 and accompanying text. 
139  See Salama, supra note 104, at 109 (indicating that CHA was required to develop only 30% of 
the units as public housing). Desperately poor public housing residents do not have the economic means 
to occupy affordable-housing and market-rate units, which are designed for those earning at least 50% of 
the area’s median income. 
140  For a more complete discussion of what constitutes an “ideal” level of integration, see infra Part 
IV.A. 
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practices.141 Hence, a violation occurs when “discriminatory actions, or 
certain actions with discriminatory effects, . . . affect the availability of 
housing.”142 Disparate impact theory concerns those actions with 
discriminatory effects. They are generally taken without overt 
discriminatory intent (i.e., actions that are facially neutral);143 but to say the 
governmental body did not intend to discriminate against a protected group 
is not to say it is necessarily free from liability for a differential outcome.144 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights 
opened the door to the possibility of holding a governmental body liable 
when the Seventh Circuit held that “a showing of discriminatory intent is 
not required under section 3604(a)” to establish a violation.145 Thirty years 
later, most federal circuit courts now apply a burden-shifting analysis.146 
The first step is to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact 
discrimination. To do so, plaintiffs must show that a “facially neutral policy 
has a significant adverse impact on members of a protected minority 
group.”147 If this initial burden is satisfied, the burden shifts to the 
governmental body to demonstrate legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy 
objectives that led to the discriminatory effect.148 It also “must demonstrate 
that the [policy or practice in question] has a ‘manifest relationship’ to the 
legitimate, non-discriminatory policy objectives and ‘is justifiable on the 
ground it is necessary to’ the attainment of these objectives.”149 Even if the 
 
141  42 U.S.C §§ 3603(a)(1), 3604 (2006). 
142  Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 
1984). Violations on the basis of discrimination against a protected group member “because of” such 
status come in three flavors: (1) individual disparate treatment, (2) disparate impact, and (3) failure to 
make a reasonable accommodation with respect to disabled persons. See Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action 
Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 2002), cert denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002). 
143  See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (marking the first time the 
Supreme Court recognized the availability of disparate impact claims, which do not require proof of 
discriminatory motive). 
144  See Cabrini-Green Local Advisory Council v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 96-C-6949, 1997 WL 
31002, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 1997); see also Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 
558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) (“A strict focus on intent permits racial discrimination to go 
unpunished in the absence of evidence of overt bigotry. As overtly bigoted behavior has become more 
unfashionable, evidence of intent has become harder to find.”). 
145  558 F.2d at 1290. The extent of the ruling was limited, however, by the court’s “refus[al] to 
conclude that every action which produces discriminatory effects is illegal.” Id. 
146  See, e.g., Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 898, 902‒03 (8th 
Cir. 2005). 
147  Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 883 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Huntington 
Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934–41 (2d Cir. 1988), judgment aff’d in part, 
488 U.S. 15 (1988) (holding that a prima facie case does not require a showing of intent, only that a 
racially discriminatory impact actually resulted). 
148  See, e.g., Darst-Webbe, 417 F.3d at 902–03; Oti Kaga, 342 F.3d at 883; Huntington Branch, 844 
F.2d at 936; cf. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658 (1989) (employing a 
fundamentally similar analysis in the analogous context of an employment discrimination case). 
149  Darst-Webbe, 417 F.3d at 902 (quoting Oti Kaga, 342 F.3d at 883). 
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governmental body successfully carries its burden, the plaintiff may yet 
prevail upon showing a less discriminatory alternative policy that would 
accomplish program goals just as effectively.150 
Cabrini-Green residents have made disparate impact claims in the past. 
In Cabrini-Green Local Advisory Council v. Chicago Housing Authority, 
residents challenged the very first set of CHA rehabilitation and demolition 
plans filed with HUD under HOPE VI.151 The initial plans called for 
neighborhood-wide redevelopment resulting in a net loss of approximately 
1000 public housing units.152 Residents contended that subsequent 
displacement would have a disproportionate adverse impact on black 
households, who overwhelmingly occupied the units scheduled for 
demolition.153 Though CHA was not accused of acting with an intent to 
discriminate, the court found that the residents’ “allegations of 
discriminatory effects [were] enough to state a claim for relief under the 
FHA.”154 The parties eventually entered a consent decree before going to 
trial.155 However, it is clear that the door remains open to disparate impact 
claims even in the absence of “overtly bigoted behavior.”156 
Today, after more than a decade of experience with HOPE VI and the 
Plan, the problem of discriminatory effects arising from redevelopment 
appears in sharp relief. A prima facie showing could be made from 
evidence of the displacement that accompanies deconcentration insofar as 
displacement results in partial reconstitution of the ghetto in outlying 
areas.157 The policy or practice in question would be CHA’s prescribed 
 
150  Id. at 902–03; Oti Kaga, 342 F.3d at 883; cf. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 
702–03 (8th Cir. 1987) (articulating the same analysis in an employment discrimination context). 
151  No. 96-C-6949, 1997 WL 31002, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 1997). 
152  Id. at *2. 
153  Id. at *3. 
154  Id. at *13. The court flatly rejected the “assertion that Arlington Heights and its progeny make 
clear that some ‘showing of discriminatory intent is required’ to establish a Fair Housing Act violation.” 
Id. 
155  See Patricia A. Wright et al., The Case of Cabrini-Green, in WHERE ARE POOR PEOPLE TO 
LIVE?, supra note 52, at 168, 174. 
156  Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977); see 
generally Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing 
and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409 (evaluating many of the fair 
housing disparate-impact cases that followed Arlington Heights and proposing a unified substantive 
standard to be applied in future cases). 
157  Cf. Seliga, supra note 93, at 1056 (explaining that the court in Gatreaux v. Chicago Housing 
Authority recognized the discrimination underpinning CHA’s policy for siting new housing projects in 
isolated, predominately black neighborhoods (citing Gatreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 
(N.D. Ill. 1969))). Disparate impact caused by the process of relocation that necessarily flows from the 
Plan should be similarly actionable. Some level of displacement is, of course, part and parcel of 
deconcentration activities. The problem is that the residents forced to vacate do not experience any real 
improvement in their quality of life, especially relative to those residents allowed to remain. See supra 
notes 113–15 and accompanying text. 
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income mix, which reserves just 30% of housing units for very low income 
tenants in Cabrini-Green.158 Though facially neutral, the mix in many ways 
perpetuates the incidence of racial segregation in Chicago’s public housing: 
It denies housing opportunities to those public housing tenants experiencing 
extreme poverty, and that denial has an adverse effect on black tenants 
because they constitute a disproportionate share of the relevant tenant 
population.159 
One contemporary legacy of Cabrini-Green’s historical isolation160 is 
that 99% of CHA residents there are black.161 Nearly every single family 
dislocated by the redevelopment (mixing) process is thus black.162 In 
accordance with the Plan, the new mixed-income community includes less 
than half the volume of public housing as before, a reduction in excess of 
1400 units.163 Only a small fraction of the original black public housing 
residents were able to return after being displaced at the time of 
redevelopment. Indeed, the newly created affordable housing and 
(especially) market-rate units, which together constitute no less than 70% of 
the neighborhood, are largely inhabited by white residents.164 Since 2000, 
more than two-thirds of new homeowners in redeveloped neighborhoods 
across the city have been white.165 Between 2000 and 2003, a time of 
 
158  See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
159  See Wright et al., supra note 155, at 169 (“The residents of Cabrini-Green are 99 percent 
African-American, and this has been the case for almost the entirety of the development’s history.”); see 
also Salama, supra note 104, at 103–04 (asserting the same point that, historically, 99% of Cabrini-
Green public housing residents have been black). In general terms, under the FHA, a policy or practice 
has a disparate impact when it “has a greater adverse impact on one racial group than on another.” 
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290. 
160  Cf. Wright et al., supra note 155, at 169. 
161  Id. As of 2009, 87% of CHA’s 21,863 residents system-wide (i.e., all the residents of CHA 
housing designated for families and seniors) were black. CHI. HOUS. AUTH., FY2009 MOVING TO WORK 
ANNUAL REPORT: PLAN FOR TRANSFORMATION YEAR 10, at 103 app.1 (2010), available at 
http://www.thecha.org/filebin/pdf/mapDocs/Final_Version-FY2009_Annual_Report.pdf. 
162  See Salama, supra note 104, at 108–09 (explaining that the Plan engendered serious concerns 
with replacement housing because the proposed redevelopment required a reduction in public housing 
units of approximately 50%). The residents have not always gone quietly. See John Bebow & Antonio 
Olivo, CHA Moves Tenants Out—But Not Up: Ex-Residents Still Live in Struggling, Segregated Areas, 
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27, 2005, § 1, at 1; Mary Schmich, Future Closes In on Cabrini, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 
2004, § 4 at 1. 
163  See BPI REPORT, supra note 109, at 61 app.A. As of September 2009, only 32% of these units 
had been constructed. Id. 
164  See, e.g., Mary Schmich, A New Day at Cabrini-Green: Key Developer Also Trying to Rebuild 
Lives, CHI. TRIB., July 8, 2004, § 2, at 1, 4 (describing market-rate renters as “typically white singles or 
couples”). 
165  See Kimbriell Kelly, Rising Values, CHI. REP., July/Aug. 2005, at 9, 9 (describing the “dramatic 
metamorphosis” that occurred around Cabrini-Green as “[t]he racial pendulum . . . swung from black to 
white”). The homeownership number is significant because market-rate units, unlike CHA units, are 
often up for sale. 
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maximum upheaval in Cabrini-Green,166 less than 2% of those granted home 
loans in the area, an indicator of the ability to purchase affordable for-sale 
and market-rate units, were black; almost 80% were white.167 The clear 
implication is that black households remain relegated to public housing 
units and in significantly smaller numbers than before. Without the means 
to move into nonpublic housing units effectively reserved for higher income 
renters, blacks will continue to give ground.168 
3. A Justifying Government Purpose.—Under the burden-shifting 
analysis, CHA or any governmental body similarly shown to have 
employed a policy or practice with discriminatory effects may argue that 
the effects are incident to legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy objectives.169 
These objectives are often framed as general statutory mandates. 
In Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Board v. Saint Louis Housing 
Authority,170 a group of public housing residents used disparate impact 
theory to challenge the St. Louis Housing Authority’s (SLHA) demolition 
of older housing projects in favor of mixed-income developments with 
fewer public housing units.171 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of 
the action after hearing the case a second time.172 The court held that the 
residents could not prevail in the face of legitimate HOPE VI policy 
objectives that justified the revitalization plan without providing a viable 
alternative, even if they presented sufficient evidence of discriminatory 
effects.173 The court also upheld the practice of maintaining a strict cap on 
the number of public housing units as necessary to the attainment of 
statutory policy objectives.174 
The SLHA identified “reducing the concentration of low-income 
housing and developing sustainable, mixed income communities” as two 
 
166  See id. at 9–10 (describing the mechanics of neighborhood change through soaring land values 
and increased annual property sales). 
167  Id. at 13. 
168  The poorest of the original public housing residents who cannot secure a new unit will be forced 
to relocate using vouchers. 
169  See sources cited supra notes 148–49. 
170  202 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Mo. 2001), aff’d in part and remanded in part, 339 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 
2003) (Darst-Webbe I), remanded to 299 F. Supp. 2d 952 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d, 417 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 
2005) (Darst-Webbe II). 
171  Darst-Webbe II, 417 F.3d at 900–01. SLHA had released a revitalization plan calling for only 80 
new public housing units (in a proposed 550-unit mixed-income development) to offset the loss of more 
than 1000 units in the targeted projects. See Brief of Appellants at 9, Darst-Webbe II, 417 F.3d 898 (No. 
04-1614). 
172  Darst-Webbe II, 417 F.3d 898. 
173  Id. at 903–06. HOPE VI policy goals include, of course, deconcentrating poverty in public 
housing and developing new mixed-income communities. Id. at 903. 
174  Id. at 903–06 (approving the use of “marketability” as a consideration in determining the 
appropriate housing mix). 
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statutory mandates constituting nondiscriminatory objectives.175 SLHA also 
articulated another particularly powerful nonstatutory objective that is likely 
to apply with equal force in the Cabrini-Green context: “[P]roviding for the 
marketability of a new mixed income community to families from a range 
of incomes by providing a balanced mix of housing types . . . .”176 
Marketability considerations in many ways appear to necessarily follow 
from the implementation of income-mixing policies. 
Granting that this objective is not pretextual and CHA’s 30% policy 
does indeed bear a manifest relationship to it,177 the proffered marketability 
objective is still of questionable legitimacy and merit. The Darst-Webbe 
court nonetheless held that achieving broad statutory goals necessitated the 
use of “a marketable housing mix so that the post-redevelopment 
population would include actively employed residents to serve as role 
models and homeowners with a vested interest in the upkeep of the 
neighborhood.”178 
This expansive notion of marketability, however, is both insufficiently 
rigorous and minimally beneficial. First, it is rooted in “imprecise 
predictive judgments” made by PHAs regarding the appropriate number of 
public housing units necessary for a stable mixed-income community.179 In 
reality, hard evidence does not appear to support the existence of any one 
solution to the mix question.180 Chosen percentages are more often the 
naked “result of negotiations between the parties with interest in and power 
over” the redevelopment process, even if they are held out as essentially 
scientific—as was the case in Cabrini-Green.181 By adhering to a low 
 
175  Id. at 903 (grounding these goals in 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(d) (2006) and § 1437v(a)(3), 
respectively). 
176  Id. (emphasis added). SLHA offered four other specific objectives, but they are not of general 
applicability and will therefore not be analyzed here. Id. 
177  Another way for plaintiffs to prevail in the burden-shifting analysis is to show that the proffered 
objectives are pretextual. See id. at 903–04. That is, the objectives are post hoc justifications for a policy 
or practice intended to discriminate against members of a protected group because of such status. 
178  Id. at 904. 
179  Id. at 903–05. The Darst-Webbe court tiptoed around nearly all of the uncomfortable 
implications of the marketability determination. The court did not, however, hesitate to endorse 
marketability as a salient factor in setting the appropriate income mix. Others have been more 
forthcoming in giving shape to the notion. One pair of developers, for instance, noted that colleagues 
“who choose to mix income groups try to avoid the mistake of overloading a project with low-income 
households and [thus] jeopardizing the marketability of higher priced units.” Paul C. Brophy & Rhonda 
N. Smith, Mixed-Income Housing: Factors for Success, CITYSCAPE, 1997, at 3, 26. 
180  See Brief of Appellants, supra note 171, at 32–35. The Darst-Webbe court admits as much. In 
fact, the evidence does not really support anything at all. See Darst-Webbe II, 417 F.3d at 904 (“[T]here 
was no one piece of evidence that stated with certainty how many low-income rental units should have 
been included or what the optimal housing mix may have been.”). 
181  Gebhardt, supra note 111, at 181 (“[The 30%] number has been outwardly portrayed as the 
maximum amount of public housing that can be feasibly supported on the site if it was to remain 
attractive to private developers and to support a viable mixed income neighborhood. However, as was 
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“marketable” cap on public housing units, the CHA resolves this 
uncertainty in the mixing calculus (decisively) in favor of middle-class 
homebuyers, the one group not facing institutional, structural, and market 
barriers to finding adequate housing. This result seems undesirable when 
considering that the FHA was drawn broadly to eliminate the most 
pervasive elements of racial discrimination and segregation in public 
housing.182 
Second, marketability judgments encode a distinct middle-class 
preference to the extent that marketable mixes are geared toward attracting 
a constant stream of market-rate buyers.183 The underlying issue is persistent 
racial tension that likely triggers, to some degree, middle-class misgivings 
about moving into historically isolated neighborhoods.184 In Cabrini-Green, 
30% thus implicitly represents an assumed steady-state arrangement 
between poor black neighbors and newly arrived middle-class residents, 
based largely on the preferences of the latter.185 The Darst-Webbe court 
obscured this issue by focusing on market studies without stopping to 
consider how regressive racial and socioeconomic attitudes informed the 
results.186 The problem here cuts at the heart of fair housing policy. 
Allowing middle-class movers, usually white families, to define the 
appropriate amount of class and racial interaction through market 
preferences undermines the FHA’s integrative norm.187 Their neighborhoods 
are particularly susceptible to the homogenizing forces that preclude an 
ideal level of integration, which occurs somewhere between the prior state 
of concentrated poverty and the present state of gentrification. The practical 
effect of relying on marketability determinations is to indirectly perpetuate 
 
the case with the Henry Horner Homes redevelopment, these assertions were not based on any verified 
evidence.”). 
182  See 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006). In passing the FHA, Congress intended to “remove the walls of 
discrimination which enclose minority groups.” 114 CONG. REC. 9563 (1968) (statement of Rep. Celler). 
Moreover, unreasonably restrictive limits on low-income housing, especially in the absence of even a 
modicum of evidence, simply cannot be construed as affirmatively furthering fair housing. See infra Part 
III.A.1. 
183  See, e.g., Brophy & Smith, supra note 179, at 25–26 (“Mixed-income housing will work only 
where there are sufficient units aimed at the higher income population to create a critical mass.”). 
184  The legacy of racial segregation in public housing, of course, still lives on in many ways. 
Indeed, a group of public housing residents among the first to move into a mixed-income community 
were told by a CHA official shortly before the transition that their new white neighbors held “[t]he 
expectation . . . that you’re going to be loud, you’re going to be raw, you’re going to be bringing 
roaches.” Flynn McRoberts, A New World—Down the Block, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 8, 1998, § 1, at 1. 
185  Cf. id. (acknowledging the general unease and racial undertones that characterized one early 
attempt to bring white middle-class families into residential proximity with black Cabrini-Green 
residents). 
186  See Darst-Webbe II, 417 F.3d 898, 904–06 (8th Cir. 2005). 
187  See infra Part III.A.1. 
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at least some existing residential segregation in service of income-mixing 
policies. 
In the end, marketability lacks legitimacy and merit as a policy 
objective. It is just a mechanism used to enforce restrictive income caps that 
often has the unfortunate effect of (re)segregating HOPE VI neighborhoods 
by race. This will be true as long as black families constitute the 
overwhelming majority of poor public housing residents, a trend that shows 
no signs of changing. 
B. Deficiencies of Income Mixing as Sound Social Policy 
The practical shortcomings of HOPE VI in light of clear statutory 
obligations to promote residential integration underscore the problems that 
income mixing presents as a primary policy objective. Specifically, 
implementation of the mixed-income principle tends to preference higher 
income newcomers at the expense of dislocated lower income residents, and 
consequently tends to reinforce racial separation over the long run through 
demographic dynamics that subvert stable integration.188 Any appearance of 
successful integration accompanying the first wave of higher income 
residents inevitably succumbs to the homogenizing force of officially 
sanctioned gentrification. Income mixing can also upset productive social 
networks and connections, the very thing it purports to encourage. For these 
reasons, income-mixing policies ought to yield to racially integrative 
policies in order to best promote the interests of those who are the intended 
beneficiaries of national housing policy. 
1. Misplaced Benefits.—First, economic integration does not 
sufficiently allocate social and economic benefits in a way that works to the 
advantage of the intended policy beneficiaries. It is important to bear in 
mind here that the first purpose set forth in the HOPE VI statute is to 
“[i]mprove the living environment” of families in distressed public 
housing—families who are overwhelmingly poor and black.189 At best, 
however, economic integration is just one ingredient in larger housing 
policy reforms that must be undertaken to achieve the ultimate end of “truly 
integrated and balanced living patterns,”190 rather than the paramount goal 
 
188  The most familiar mechanisms that enforce this preference, discussed earlier in this Part, are 
considerations of marketability and (relatedly) strict caps on the number of public housing units 
available in new mixed-income developments. See supra Part III.A. Public housing residents are 
therefore unable to stay in their gentrifying neighborhoods at anything close to predevelopment 
numbers. See Salama, supra note 104, at 108–09. And those who are displaced often end up in other 
segregated neighborhoods, no better off than before. See Vale & Graves, supra note 99, at 53–55. 
189  Notice of Funding Availability, supra note 4, at 60,178; see also CHA PLAN, supra note 99, at 
11 (noting that the first goal of the Plan is to “[p]rovide quality housing opportunities to very low and 
low-income households”). 
190  114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). 
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itself. This is so because any connection between economic integration and 
the production of social benefits for the poorest residents rests on a series of 
strained assumptions: 
The premise of the mixed-income objective is that poor people are more likely 
to improve their social condition and their behavior through exposure to higher 
income households. While this argument may have some validity, it is 
predicated on primarily cultural and behavioral explanations for social 
problems that are also partly structural and institutional. The mixed-income 
narrative privileges discourses of social dysfunction as the root cause of 
continued poverty.191 
Such an approach implicitly recognizes the domination of middle-class 
tastes and preferences in community building and income mixing, much 
like the notion of marketability. But the role model theory does not bear 
much fruit in practice.192 Very poor residents are often not receptive to their 
new, higher income neighbors and struggle to make the kinds of formal and 
informal connections that lead to material gain.193 Moreover, the singular 
pursuit of economic integration obscures what is recognized, at least on 
paper, as a prominent goal of HOPE VI redevelopments under the FHA: 
Improving the lives of as many poor public housing residents as possible.194 
The benefit instead largely accrues to moderate-income residents and 
private developers,195 while many of the poorest residents are dislocated and 
thus excluded altogether.196 Catering to middle-class tastes and preferences 
 
191  Alexander, supra note 11, at 155. 
192  See, e.g., Cornelia Grumman, The Human Factor, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 30, 1996), http://articles. 
chicagotribune.com/1996-03-30/news/9701150613_1_cabrini-role-models-mixed-income (interviewing 
CHA residents who clearly “doubted the effect that working-class ‘role models’ would have on the 
habits of some very poor residents in a mixed-income neighborhood”).  
193  See Ellickson, supra note 27, at 1012–16. 
194  See supra Part II.A; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 48, at 2–6 (declaring that a “true and 
long-lasting solution” requires equal attention to not only geographic surroundings, but also social and 
economic conditions). 
195  Cf. Lawrence Vale, Housing Chicago: Cabrini-Green to Parkside of Old Town, DESIGN 
OBSERVER (Feb. 20, 2012), http://places.designobserver.com/feature/housing-chicago-cabrini-green-to-
parkside-of-old-town/32298/ (“Developers succeed in placing upscale new uses; a haunted housing 
authority succeeds in replacing deteriorated housing on a perpetually haunted site; and residents get 
displaced from their homes and communities.”). The “systematic dispersal” of public housing residents 
increases property values and creates the proper incentives for private developers and higher income 
movers to revitalize neighborhoods. See Matthew H. Greene, The HOPE VI Paradox: Why Do HUD’s 
Most Successful Housing Developments Fail to Benefit the Poorest of the Poor?, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 191, 
195 (2008) (“This systematic dispersal leads to . . . a repopulation of the area by a mixture of market-
rate renters along with a small percentage of the original subsidized tenants.”); id. at 204–15. Relying on 
a “demand-side approach” to public housing through mixed-finance provisions leaves low-income 
residents at the whim of private sector developers who will largely cater to upper-income residents 
driving the market. See Smith, supra note 52, at 36–37. 
196  See Academic Perspectives on the Future of Public Housing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 18 (2009) (prepared statement 
of Susan J. Popkin, Dir., Urban Inst.) (“[O]ur research shows that the program has not been a solution 
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means that public housing residents reap social benefits only to the extent 
that their interests converge with those of their wealthier neighbors. The 
more probable outcome, experience teaches, is continued segregation. 
2. Undermining Social Capital.—HOPE VI developments also fail to 
cultivate sufficient social capital in the exclusive pursuit of economic 
diversity. The concept of social capital captures “the ways in which 
individuals and communities create trust, maintain social networks, and 
establish norms that enable participants to act cooperatively toward the 
pursuit of shared goals.”197 Social capital should be of paramount concern to 
policymakers because it is the amalgamation of the intangible things that tie 
people together, a necessary and elusive ingredient in successful 
neighborhood-based redevelopment.198 Yet the dual forces of economic 
integration and spatial deconcentration may do as much to undermine 
existing networks as they do to build new ones.199 
One aspect of the problem is dislocation arising from the inability of 
HOPE VI redevelopments to accommodate most of the residents forced out 
of overflowing high-rises.200 The constitutive elements of social capital—
trust, shared norms, and social bonds—are particularly susceptible to 
physical and social upheaval in changing neighborhoods. Indeed, the “loss 
of extensive networks of family and friends may . . . increase[] social 
isolation if [residents’] new neighborhoods are hostile to them on account 
 
for those hard-to-house families who suffered the worst consequences of distressed public 
housing, . . . the most vulnerable, . . . [the] long-term public housing residents who are coping with 
multiple, complex problems . . . .”); see also id. at 119 app. (“In many cities, . . . the poorest and least 
desirable tenants [are] warehoused in the worst developments. As these developments have been 
demolished, housing authorities have often simply moved these vulnerable families from one distressed 
development to another . . . these replacement developments have the potential to become even worse 
environments than those from where these families started.”). 
197  Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land Use, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 529 (2006); see generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE 
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (exploring the concept of social capital and 
its recent general decline in American society). Bowling Alone is widely regarded as providing a 
landmark analysis of the phenomenon of social capital. Commentators have thus referred to author 
Robert Putnam as “the most prominent analyst of social capital.” See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 27, at 
1008, 1014. 
198  See PUTNAM, supra note 197, at 307–18. 
199  See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 27, at 1009–10 (“From what is now known, there are grounds for 
skepticism about the capacity of a mixed-income housing project to enhance the aggregate stock of 
social capital.”). 
200  For a complete discussion of the ways in which dislocation affects the foundational aspects of 
social capital, see Alexandra M. Curley, Neighborhood Institutions, Facilities, and Public Space: A 
Missing Link for HOPE VI Residents’ Development of Social Capital?, CITYSCAPE, 2010, at 33, 33–34 
(reassessing HOPE VI communities “by examining some of the potential mechanisms for developing 
social capital in the neighborhood and by considering how relocation might shape residents’ access to 
social capital”). 
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of their class or race. . . . ‘[G]eographic proximity does not a neighbor 
make—at least not in the social sense.’”201 
The loss of such networks to spatial dispersion of public housing 
residents especially affects black communities.202 Most HOPE VI 
redevelopments experience dramatic swings in racial composition.203 This 
process, usually part and parcel of neighborhood gentrification, undermines 
the kind of continuity that leads to meaningful production of social capital. 
Of course integration cannot be realized without some measure of upheaval; 
however, severe dislocation in many HOPE VI neighborhoods where 
thousands of public housing units were sacrificed and restrictive admissions 
policies fenced out would-be returnees—including friends and family—
breaks too many important bonds. Without showing sensitivity to racial 
composition, it is difficult to maintain powerful social networks that nurture 
successful communities. 
3. Subordinating Income Mixing to Racial Integration.—Even 
though specifically addressed to the problem of concentrated poverty, the 
underlying failure of HOPE VI to facilitate, or simply not impede, racial 
integration in neighborhoods like Cabrini-Green is the most significant 
shortcoming of income-mixing policies more generally. Because the 
conflict seems inevitable, the competing policies should be reconciled with 
a view toward the interests of the intended beneficiaries of national housing 
policy. As I have argued in this Part and will further demonstrate in the 
next, this group is better served by racially integrative policies. 
One additional reason racially integrative policies like the FHA should 
trump income-mixing policies is that, to the extent there is overlap, the 
legacy of segregation has partially created and sustained the legacy of 
concentrated poverty in public housing, and not the other way around. On 
this point, sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton note that 
“segregation concentrates poverty to build a set of mutually reinforcing and 
self-feeding spirals of decline into black neighborhoods.”204 Racially 
integrative policies are thus a superior option for addressing the root causes 
of decline in urban neighborhoods historically associated with public 
 
201  Foster, supra note 197, at 565 (quoting Xavier de Souza Briggs, Moving Up Versus Moving Out: 
Neighborhood Effects in Housing Mobility Programs, 8 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 195, 197 (1997)). 
202  This is true because blacks generally constitute the largest share of the existing public housing 
population when redevelopment begins. See, e.g., Wright et al., supra note 155, at 169. Relocation 
during and after the construction phase thus uproots a disproportionate number of black residents who 
were previously plugged into local networks. See supra notes 157–68 and accompanying text 
(developing this point more thoroughly). 
203  See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 165. 
204  DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 2 (1993). 
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housing. HOPE VI, on the other hand, does not seem to offer the same 
promise: 
While the program goals of income deconcentration and integration are 
prescribed in detail in the statute and regulations governing HOPE VI, goals of 
racial deconcentration and integration are amorphous and diffuse. This lack of 
specificity regarding racial desegregation reflects current judicial suspicion 
towards race-based remedies. The danger of this approach is that policies that 
do not engage the structures of community disadvantage in terms of race 
cannot dismantle those institutions and policies formed using race as an 
explicit criterion.205 
The most prominent housing policies can and must, without resort to 
impermissible race-conscious remedies,206 address urban problems—such as 
violence, unemployment, and an overwhelming sense of hopelessness—in 
large measure produced and sustained by racial segregation. Yet income-
mixing policies rely instead on the wrongheaded assumption “that solving 
the issue of class makes a major difference on racial outcomes.”207 This is 
akin to the familiar problem of treating the symptoms rather than the 
underlying disease. While income mixing may provide temporary relief as 
poor minority neighborhoods open up to middle-income white families, the 
constant pressure of gentrification has proved too much for sustainable 
integration—patterns of racial separation are reproduced, as are the 
associated harms.208 Accordingly, income mixing ought to be subordinated 
to racial integration to reflect the proper direction of national housing policy 
into the future. 
IV. REAFFIRMING RACIAL INTEGRATION AS A PARAMOUNT POLICY GOAL 
The question of how to reformulate national housing policy is 
especially pressing as HOPE VI nears its end. In light of irreconcilable 
tensions between a predominantly mixed-income approach and robust 
levels of racial integration, I propose a new direction for housing policy 
based on reaffirming racial integration as a primary goal. One way to 
accomplish this is to subordinate income-mixing considerations to 
meaningful racial integration in neighborhoods whenever the two come into 
 
205  Pindell, supra note 79, at 388 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
206  Strict scrutiny is, of course, applied even to those policies that classify on the basis of race in 
order to advance the interests of minorities. The Supreme Court has thus struck down race-conscious 
remedies on a number of occasions. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) 
(concerning a program that promoted minority business enterprises in awarding municipal contracts); 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (considering an affirmative action program 
employing a quota system). 
207  Gary Orfield, Suburban Exclusion and the Courts: Can a Class-Based Remedy Reduce Urban 
Segregation?, in RACE, POVERTY, AND DOMESTIC POLICY, supra note 35, at 242, 258. 
208  See, e.g., Greene, supra note 195, at 205–21; Vale & Graves, supra note 99, at 53–55. 
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conflict. Reemphasizing racial integration in the redevelopment of public 
housing would spur the production of social capital and other important 
benefits by remedying the related harms of racial isolation and displacement 
that have continued to mar HOPE VI projects. More importantly, adopting 
an integrative norm comports with both the express obligations and 
underlying spirit of the FHA. An expansive reading of the affirmatively 
further provision indeed demands such a norm.209 This Part first articulates 
an ideal integrative vision for housing policy under the FHA and then offers 
three mechanisms that affirmatively implement this vision. 
A. An Integrative Norm 
The racial pendulum has swung too far from black to white in many 
HOPE VI developments.210 While certain neighborhoods that once 
experienced complete residential segregation, like Cabrini-Green, are now 
integrated to some extent, the dramatic shift toward middle-class whites 
does not represent the most preferred outcome.211 The ideal level of racial 
integration lies instead somewhere between these two extremes. While the 
most natural definition of a racially integrated neighborhood seems to be 
half black and half white,212 it makes little practical sense to assign a 
definite value to an ideally integrated neighborhood other than to say that it 
should not deviate too far from the middle (allowing, of course, for the fact 
that fewer blacks live in America than whites).213 This vision, at its core, 
relies instead on the notion that a racially integrated neighborhood is one 
where blacks and whites “shar[e] spaces on relatively equal grounds.”214 
Neighbors thus have ample opportunity to engage in “biracial interaction,” 
 
209  See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
210  See Kelly, supra note 165, at 9 (“The racial pendulum [in Cabrini-Green] has swung from black 
to white.”). 
211  This critique applies with special force in gentrifying neighborhoods, rather than neighborhoods 
that remained primarily black when middle-class movers came in, like Henry Horner Homes in Chicago. 
See Susan J. Popkin, The HOPE VI Program: What Has Happened to the Residents?, in WHERE ARE 
POOR PEOPLE TO LIVE?, supra note 52, at 68, 72; see also Ben Austen, The Last Tower: The Decline 
and Fall of Public Housing, HARPER’S MAG. (May 2012), http://harpers.org/archive/2012/05/0083897 
(noting that most original Cabrini-Green residents have been “uprooted and replanted in unfamiliar areas 
no less uniformly poor and black—though now they [have] had to manage without the support networks 
and extended family that had surrounded them in public housing”). 
212  For the sake of simplicity, this discussion abstracts away from the obviously multiethnic 
character of many public housing developments today. 
213  See generally INGRID GOULD ELLEN, SHARING AMERICA’S NEIGHBORHOODS 12–19 (2000) 
(discussing academic attempts to define the term “racial integration” within the context of stable 
neighborhoods). 
214  Id. at 16. 
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social contact that involves more than mere geographic mixing.215 Housing 
policy should strive to foster such integrated conditions in managing new 
and existing communities, including mixed-income neighborhoods that 
presently limit minority presence through restrictive policy mechanisms. 
Cabrini-Green, for instance, should not be considered truly integrated until 
CHA policies cease to effectively cap the proportion of black residents at 
30%. 
Reemphasizing racial integration as a primary goal of public housing is 
rooted in a desirably broad reading of the FHA’s affirmatively further 
mandate.216 Indeed, it is the only way to actually promote an end to racial 
segregation and to “fulfill, as much as possible, the goal of open, integrated 
residential housing patterns.”217 PHAs grappling with deeply entrenched 
legacies of racial discrimination in public housing must honestly confront 
structural and institutional barriers to integration in order to achieve the 
substantive goals embodied in the FHA.218 Doing so would simultaneously 
obviate most concerns about policies that may have a disparate impact on 
black public housing residents. Affirmatively pursuing truly integrated 
communities implies greater housing opportunities and less displacement 
for such residents. Discriminatory effects are thus less likely to fall 
disproportionately on black families. 
Reemphasizing racial integration would also enable the production of 
important social benefits. HOPE VI’s single-minded focus on income 
mixing undermined such benefits to the extent that residents were 
dislocated and neighborhoods resegregated.219 Making efforts to achieve 
meaningful racial integration in public housing communities, on the other 
hand, avoids many problems of spatial dispersion. Original black residents 
of public housing would thus retain more of their critical social networks 
and could more easily build a positive sense of neighborhood identification 
as an equal presence, rather than beginning anew as an isolated minority 
group. Racial integration would further “provide opportunities for exposure 
and interaction between whites and minorities[] [that] appear[] to contribute 
 
215  See id. at 16‒17; HARVEY LUSKIN MOLOTCH, MANAGED INTEGRATION 202 (1972) (arguing that 
“[i]ntegration of a thoroughgoing type” requires not only geographic proximity but also “transracial 
solidarity”). 
216  42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006). 
217  Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973). 
218  Cf. Pindell, supra note 79, at 388 (noting that the failure of HOPE VI to account adequately for 
race as “a primary cause of current, pervasive residential economic and racial segregation” has 
undermined the program’s success, and that problems created by intentional racial discrimination cannot 
be adequately undone using only race-blind remedies). Racial barriers have evolved over many years to 
escape detection as overt intentional discrimination; instead, they live on as subtle, nearly imperceptible 
technologies of segregation and subordination. 
219  For a complete discussion of this critical point, see supra Part III.B. 
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to greater tolerance, fair-mindedness, and openness to diverse networks and 
settings.”220 In other words, residential integration is beneficial for members 
of all races. 
B. Affirmative Mechanisms 
National housing policy should continue to encourage investment in 
physical development and rehabilitation projects. Unlike voucher programs 
that scatter residents among existing neighborhoods, adequately funded 
public housing communities create opportunities for PHAs to actively 
promote stable racial integration by exercising some control over 
demographic composition. Such communities also avoid simply displacing 
residential segregation and concentrated poverty to adjacent, similarly 
impoverished neighborhoods.221 Moreover, a project-based approach offers 
the best prospects for affirmatively increasing housing opportunities for 
poor black residents in truly integrated and gentrifying neighborhoods that 
enjoy the social benefits and economic advantages traditionally 
accompanying additional affluence. This is, after all, what it means to 
affirmatively further fair housing. The three proposed mechanisms that 
follow concretely illustrate how housing authorities can move toward more 
racially integrated housing. 
First, restrictive income mixing that derives in part from marketability 
concerns should be abandoned. This is especially true for neighborhoods 
where income caps directly impede progress toward racial integration, as in 
Cabrini-Green. Put another way, uncertainty regarding the upper limit on 
the public housing share must be resolved in favor of the poor (often black) 
residents who are the primary beneficiaries of the FHA’s substantive 
protections. Marketability cannot be allowed to deny benefits to the very 
group for whom redevelopment was undertaken. 
This important notion is known broadly as vertical equity.222 In 
practice, it entails a focus on building integrated neighborhoods that are 
composed of an ideal share of poor, black public housing residents, rather 
than catering to the often discriminatory preferences of incoming middle-
 
220  MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & LYNETTE RAWLINGS, URBAN INST., PROMOTING NEIGHBORHOOD 
DIVERSITY 4 (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411955promotingneighborhood 
diversity.pdf. 
221  Cf. ANTHONY DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS 26 (1973) (making this point). In too many 
cases, uprooted black residents simply ended up in hypersegregated neighborhoods elsewhere. See 
Popkin, supra note 211 (“In Chicago nearly all the original residents who moved with vouchers ended 
up in neighborhoods that were at least 90 percent African-American.”). 
222  Vertical equity as a norm “provides that the neediest should derive the greatest benefits” from 
redistributive social programs. Schill, supra note 12, at 539; see also Ellickson, supra note 27, at 1003–
08 (distinguishing between “vertical equity”—aimed at distributing benefits primarily to the most 
impoverished—and “horizontal equity”—aimed at “treat[ing] like households alike”). 
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class households. Sociological research demonstrates that seeking to 
increase the number of black residents can be a viable strategy.223 
Abandoning strict income mixing would ultimately allow more black public 
housing residents to return to their original neighborhoods following 
redevelopment.224 In Cabrini-Green, for example, every additional unit of 
public housing created by relaxing the 30% cap would likely result in one 
fewer black family displaced from their home. 
Second, mixed communities should foster an inclusive neighborhood 
atmosphere and positive racial image. One way to implement this policy is 
to encourage black participation in neighborhood institutions, such as 
resident advisory boards. These institutions, both formal and informal, are 
an important site of biracial interaction.225 Community projects undertaken 
by both races also counter the familiar feeling among blacks that they are 
“wholly unwelcome” in neighborhoods where their racial community is 
small and isolated.226 Creating an inclusive atmosphere is particularly 
important given that “a sense of community, and positive neighborhood 
identification are the essential features of social organization in urban 
areas.”227 The effect of these efforts would be to keep existing black 
communities within larger neighborhoods intact despite social and 
demographic pressure from gentrification. In Cabrini-Green, for example, 
encouraging black residents to meaningfully participate in decisions 
regarding important neighborhood issues and take the lead on community 
betterment projects would signal that they are an invested and enduring 
neighborhood presence. 
Third, PHAs should engage in affirmative marketing campaigns that 
promote neighborhood amenities of special significance to black families 
with the means to occupy non-public housing units. To be successful, these 
campaigns must generate more demand among blacks than among whites.228 
 
223  One recent study found “little evidence . . . that present racial composition influences 
neighborhood satisfaction” among white residents, though the perception of continual racial change may 
still have an effect. ELLEN, supra note 213, at 103. The author goes on to note that “households—both 
black and white—might be a good deal less concerned about their neighborhood’s racial mix than is 
commonly believed and than is indicated by the often-cited surveys of racial preferences.” Id. at 129. 
Potential movers with a preference for discrimination, on the other hand, can simply elect to avoid 
integrated neighborhoods. 
224  Existing social networks would thus endure, limiting the loss of social capital caused by the 
redevelopment process. 
225  See MOLOTCH, supra note 215, at 201 (“[E]xtensive integration (primarily by demographic 
indices) occurs in places like retail shops, church chapels, and formal organizations oriented toward the 
accomplishment of instrumental goals.”). 
226  Cf. ELLEN, supra note 213, at 58 (noting that blacks sometimes avoid moving into white 
neighborhoods to avoid hostility from the majority group). 
227  WILSON, supra note 67, at 143. 
228  See MOLOTCH, supra note 215, at 110. 
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Identifying neighborhood amenities that blacks find particularly appealing 
is therefore a critical task. PHAs could create community housing centers or 
collaborate with other organizations to reach out to potential movers (of all 
races) in hopes of attracting black families who might not otherwise 
consider the neighborhood.229 An effective campaign would further racial 
integration by attracting black families who have sufficient incomes to 
inhabit affordable-housing or market-rate units generally occupied by 
higher income white families in gentrifying neighborhoods like Cabrini-
Green, thus moving closer to the goal of achieving stable levels of 
integration. In the end, these three policy recommendations, considered as a 
whole, would further actual racial integration as required under the FHA’s 
affirmative mandate. 
CONCLUSION 
While HOPE VI has improved a number of lives, there is no reason to 
grow complacent now. Too many neighborhoods with substantial public 
housing still bear the ugly marks of racial segregation and extreme poverty. 
At this pivotal moment in U.S. housing policy, we should chart a new 
course by reaffirming our paramount interest in racially integrative policies. 
This course entails abandoning the notion of marketability, creating more 
inclusive communities, and affirmatively marketing housing opportunities 
with the goal of reaching a critical mass of racially diverse residents 
wherever public housing is undergoing redevelopment. Taken together, the 
proposed policy mechanisms are true to the substantive call of the FHA to 
affirmatively further fair housing. 
Only when housing authorities rediscover the racial integration norm 
will black public housing residents finally get what they are due. After fifty 
years of misguided policy and systemic failure, it is a long time coming. 
 
 
229  One commentator describes this process as “benign steering.” ELLEN, supra note 213, at 167–68. 
